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Abstract
ThepaperexplorestheviewthattheAsiancurrencyand¿nancialcrisesin1997and1998
reÀected structural and policy distortions in the countries of the region, even though market
overreaction and herding caused the plunge of exchange rates, asset prices and economic
activity to be more severe than was warranted by the initial weak economic conditions. The
¿rst part of the paper provides an overview of economic fundamentals in Asia on the eve
of the crisis, with emphasis on current account imbalances, quantity and quality of ¿nancial
‘overlending’, banking problems, and the composition, maturity and size of capital inÀows.
The second part of the paper presents a reconstruction of the Asian meltdown — from the
antecedents in 1995-96 to the recent developments in the summer of 1998 — in parallel with
a survey of the debate on the strategies to recover from the crisis, the role of international
intervention, and the costs and bene¿ts of capital controls.
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What were the causes of the Asian economic, currency and ¿nancial crises of 1997-
98? Two main hypotheses and interpretations have emerged in the aftermath of the crisis.
According to one view, sudden shifts in market expectations and con¿dence were the key
sources of the initial ¿nancial turmoil, its propagation over time and regional contagion. While
the macroeconomic performance of some countries had worsened in the mid 1990s, the extent
and depth of the 1997-98 crisis should not be attributed to a deterioration in fundamentals,
but rather to panic on the part of domestic and international investors, somewhat reinforced
by the faulty policy response of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the international
¿nancial community.
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According to the other view — advanced in this paper — the crisis reÀected structural
and policy distortions in the countries of the region. Fundamental imbalances triggered the
currency and ¿nancial crisis in 1997, even if, once the crisis started, market overreaction and
herding caused the plunge of exchange rates, asset prices and economic activity to be more
severe than warranted by the initial weak economic conditions. A synthetic overview of our
interpretationisprovidedinsection2, whilesections3-5presentasystematicassessmentofthe
sources of economic tension at the root of the Asian crisis. This is based on the analysis of the
available empirical evidence for the following countries: South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Hong Kong, China and Taiwan. Macroeconomic imbalances
in these countries are assessed within a broad overview of structural factors: current account
de¿cits and foreign indebtedness, growth and inÀation rates, savings and investment ratios,
budget de¿cits, real exchange rates, foreign reserves, corporate sector investment, measures
of debt and pro¿tability, indexes of excessive bank lending, indicators of credit growth and
¿nancial fragility, monetary stances, debt-service ratios, dynamics and composition of capital
inÀows and outÀows, and political instability.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 6 presents a reconstruction of the
Asian meltdown, from the period leading to the crisis to its eruption in 1997, and discusses
policy responses, contagion effects, and the role of Japan. In section 7 we provide an overview
ofthedebateonpolicystrategiestorecoverfromthecrisis, withparticularemphasisontherole
played by the IMF. Section 8 singles out the key points in the current debate about the reform
of the international ¿nancial system and the desirability of free capital mobility. Section 9
focusesonthemostrecentevolutionoftheAsianmeltdownintoaglobalturmoilinthesummer
of 1998. The ¿nal section outlines a few open issues in assessing the implications of the crises.
3 We thank Ignazio Visco and seminar participants at the NBER IFM Program Meeting, March 1998, the
CEPR-World Bank Conference on “Financial Crises: Contagion and Market Volatility”, May 1998, the Uni-
versity of Washington, and the Bank of Italy for helpful comments on the earlier drafts of this paper. We also
thank Michele Cavallo, Scott Nicholson and Andrew Tif¿n for excellent research assistance. Giancarlo Corsetti
acknowledges ¿nancial support from MURST. The views expressed here are those of the authors, and do not nec-
essarily reÀect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, or any other institution with which the authors
are af¿liated.
Correspondence: corsetti@econ.yale.edu, paolo.pesenti@ny.frb.org, and nroubini@stern.nyu.edu.
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4 See Radelet and Sachs (1998) for the most comprehensive exposition of this view.10
2. At the root of the Asian crisis
CentraltoafullunderstandingoftherootsoftheAsiancrisisisthemultifacetedevidence
on the structure of incentives under which the corporate and ¿nancial sectors operated in the
region, in the context of regulatory inadequacies and close links between public and private
institutions.
2 The moral hazard problem in Asia magni¿ed the ¿nancial vulnerability of the
region during the process of ¿nancial markets liberalization in the 1990s, exposing its fragility
vis-à-vis the macroeconomic and ¿nancial shocks that occurred in the period 1995-1997.
The problem exhibited three different, yet strictly interrelated dimensions at the corporate,
¿nancial, and international level.
3
At the corporate level, political pressures to maintain high rates of economic growth had
led to a long tradition of public guarantees to private projects, some of which were effectively
undertaken under government control, directly subsidized, or supported by policies of directed
credit to favored ¿rms and/or industries.
4 Even in the absence of explicit promises of ‘bail-
out’, the production plans and strategies of the corporate sector largely overlooked costs and
riskiness of the underlying investment projects.
5 With ¿nancial and industrial policy enmeshed
within a widespread business sector network of personal and political favoritism, and with
governments that appeared willing to intervene in favor of troubled ¿rms, markets operated
under the impression that the return on investment was somewhat ‘insured’ against adverse
shocks.
Such pressures and beliefs represented the underpinnings of a sustained process of
capital accumulation,
6 resulting into persistent and sizable current account de¿cits.
7 While
common wisdom holds that borrowing from abroad to ¿nance domestic investment should not
raise concerns about external solvency — it could actually be the optimal course of action for
undercapitalized economies with good investment opportunities — the evidence for the Asian
countries in the mid-1990s highlights that the pro¿tability of new investment projects was low.
For instance, in Korea, 20 of the largest 30 conglomerates displayed in 1996 a rate of return
on invested capital below the cost of capital. In 1997, before the crisis, as many as 7 of the 30
largest conglomerates could be considered effectively bankrupt.
8
Investment rates and capital inÀo w sinA s i are m a i n e dh ig he v e na ft e rt h en e g a ti v es ig n a l s
sent by the indicators of pro¿tability. In part, this occurred because the interest rate fall in
5 This section is based on Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998). A partial list of recent studies providing em-
pirical evidence on the Asian crisis includes Alba et al. (1998), Dornbusch (1998 a), Feldstein (1998), Goldstein
(1998), IMF (1998), and Radelet and Sachs (1998). A large number of contributions on the crisis are available
online on Nouriel Roubini’s Asian Crisis Homepage at www.stern.nyu.edu/~nroubini/asia/AsiaHomepage.html.
6 The role of moral hazard in the onset of the Asian crisis has been stressed by a number of authors. See
e.g. Krugman (1998 a), Greenspan (1998), Fischer (1998 b).
7 IMF (1997).
8 See Pomerleano (1998) for a thorough assessment of the corporate roots of the ¿nancial crisis in Asia.
9 See section 3.4.
: See section 3.1.
; See e.g. OECD (1988) for the analysis of the Korean case.11
industrial countries (especially in Japan) lowered the cost of capital for ¿rms and motivated
large ¿nancial Àows into the Asian countries. However, the crucial factor underlying the
sustained investment rates was the ¿nancial side of the moral hazard problem in Asia, leading
national banks to borrow excessively from abroad and lend excessively at home.
9 Financial
intermediation played a key role in channelling funds toward projects that were marginal if not
outright unpro¿table from a social point of view.
The literature has focused on a long list of structural distortions in the pre-crisis Asian
¿nancial and banking sectors: lax supervision and weak regulation low capital adequacy
ratios lack of incentive-compatible deposit insurance schemes insuf¿cient expertise in the
regulatory institutions distorted incentives for project selection and monitoring outright
corrupt lending practices non-market criteria of credit allocation, according to a model of
relationship banking that emphasizes semi-monopolistic relations between banks and ¿rms,
somehow downplaying price signals. All these factors contributed to the build-up of severe
weaknesses in the undercapitalized ¿nancial system, whose most visible manifestation was
eventually a growing share of non-performing loans.
The adverse consequences of these distortions were crucially magni¿ed by the rapid
process of capital account liberalization and ¿nancial market deregulation in the region during
the 1990s, which increased the supply-elasticity of funds from abroad.
10 The extensive
liberalization of capital markets was consistent with the policy goal of providing a large supply
of low-cost funds to national ¿nancial institutions and the domestic corporate sector. The same
goal motivated exchange rate policies aimed at reducing the volatility of the domestic currency
in terms of the US dollar, thus lowering the risk premium on dollar-denominated debt.
The international dimension of the moral hazard problem hinged upon the behavior of
international banks, which over the period leading to the crisis had lent large amounts of funds
to the region’s domestic intermediaries, with apparent neglect of the standards for sound risk
assessment.
11 Underlying such overlending syndrome may have been the presumption that
short-term interbank cross-border liabilities would be effectively guaranteed by either a direct
government intervention in favor of the ¿nancial debtors, or by an indirect bail-out through
IMF support programs. A very large fraction of foreign debt accumulation was in the form
of bank-related short-term, unhedged, foreign-currency denominated liabilities: by the end
of 1996, a share of short-term liabilities in total liabilities above 50% was the norm in the
region. Moreover, the ratio of short-term external liabilities to foreign reserves — a widely
used indicator of ¿nancial fragility — was above 100% in Korea, Indonesia and Thailand.
12
The core implication of moral hazard is that an adverse shock to pro¿tability does
not induce ¿nancial intermediaries to be more cautious in lending, and to follow ¿nancial
strategies reducing the overall riskiness of their portfolios. Quite the opposite, in the face of
negative circumstances the anticipation of a future bail-out provides a strong incentive to take
on even more risk — that is, as Krugman (1998 a) writes, “to play a game of heads I win, tails
< See section 4.
43 See e.g. McKinnon and Pill (1996).
44 See e.g. Stiglitz (1998).
45 See section 5.12
the taxpayer loses.” In this respect, a number of country-speci¿c and global shocks contributed
to severely deteriorate the overall economic outlook in the Asian region, exacerbating the
distortions already in place.
In particular, the long period of stagnation of the Japanese economy in the 1990s led to a
signi¿cant export slowdown from the Asian countries in the months preceding the eruption of
the crisis, the hopes for a Japanese recovery were shattered by a sudden decline in economic
activity in this country. Sector-speci¿cs h o c k ss u c ha st h ef a l li nt h ed e m a n df o rs e m i -
conductors in 1996, and adverse terms of trade Àuctuations also contributed to the worsening
of the trade balances in the region between 1996 and 1997.
The sharp appreciation of the US dollar relative to the Japanese yen and the European
currencies since the second half of 1995 led to deteriorating cost-competitiveness in most
Asian countries whose currencies were effectively pegged to the dollar.
13 Based on standard
real exchange rate measures, many Asian currencies appreciated in the 1990s, although the
degree of real appreciation was not as large as in previous episodes of currency collapses
(such as Mexico in 1994) and the dynamics of the real exchange rate was asymmetric across
countries: by 1997 the extent of real appreciation was evident in Malaysia and the Philippines,
while in South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia, real exchange rate indicators had not moved
signi¿cantly relatively to 1990. In general, competitive pressures were enhanced by the
increasing weight of China in total export from the region.
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As a result of the cumulative effects of the ¿nancial and real imbalances considered
above, by 1997 the Asian countries appeared quite vulnerable to ¿nancial crises, either related
to sudden switches in market con¿dence and sentiment, or driven by deteriorating expectations
about the poor state of fundamentals. In 1997, the drop of the real estate and stock markets —
where sustained speculative trends were in part fueled by foreign capital inÀo w s—l e dt ot h e
emergence of wide losses and outright defaults in the corporate and ¿nancial sectors. Policy
uncertainty stemming from the lack of commitment to structural reforms by the domestic
authorities worsened the overall climate. From the summer of 1997 onward, rapid reversals
of ¿nancial capital inÀows led to the collapse of regional currencies amidst domestic and
international investors panic.
15
46 Expectations of a monetary contraction in the US in the summer of 1997 may have also played a role in
precipitating the crisis.
47 Whether cost-competitiveness deteriorated in the rest of the region after the 50% devaluation of the Chi-
nese currency in 1994 is still a matter of debate. The thesis that “a large part of China’s recent export success
reÀects the devaluation that occurred in January 1994” and that this “cheap-currency policy” was “one of the
factors provoking the crisis in Southeast Asia” has been espoused in a Financial Times editorial (September 17,
1997) and echoed in the popular press (see for instance The Economist, November 22, 1997, or Business Times,
March 17, 1998). Recent studies (IMF (1997), Liu, Noland, Robinson and Wang (1998) and Fernald, Edison
and Loungani (1998)) dismiss the thesis on the basis of several factors, most notably the fact that by 1993 about
80% of Chinese transactions were already settled at the swap market rate, not the of¿cial rate, so that the of¿cial
exchange rate devaluation inÀuenced only about 20% of the foreign exchange transactions.
48 For a reconstruction of the crisis, see section 6 and IMF (1997) and (1998).13
3. Current account imbalances and macroeconomic fundamentals
3.1 The evidence
We start our study of the Asian crisis by assessing the evidence on current account
imbalances in the region over the 1990s. The potential role of current account de¿cits as a
source of disruptive tensions in the ¿nancial markets has been repeatedly emphasized in the
literature.
16 On the anniversary of the Mexican ¿nancial crisis, Lawrence Summers, the US
Deputy Treasury Secretary, wrote in The Economist that “close attention should be paid to
any current account de¿cit in excess of 5% of GDP, particularly if it is ¿nanced in a way that
c o u l dl e a dt or a p i dr e v e r s a l s . ”
17 By this standard, a number of countries in our sample provided
reasons for concern.
As shown in Tables 1 and 2, several Asian countries whose currencies collapsed in 1997
had experienced somewhat sizable current account de¿cits in the 1990s. In the two Tables we
show two measures of the current account (as a share of GDP), one based on national income
account (NIA) and the other based on balance of payments data in the discussion we will
mostly rely on the NIA data.
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The two countries with the largest and most persistent current account imbalances in our
sample were Thailand and Malaysia, both of which experienced de¿c i t sf o ro v e rad e c a d e .
Based on NIA data, the current account in Thailand was over 6% of GDP virtually in each year
in the 1990s, and approached 9% of GDP in 1995 and 1996. Similarly large numbers were
observed in Malaysia, where the de¿cit was above 10% of GDP in 1993, while slowly falling
to 3.7% of GDP in 1996. The Philippines also experienced long-term imbalances in having a
de¿cit around or above 5% of GDP for four years and lastingly high in the remaining years.
Indonesia started the decade with a large imbalance (over 4% of GDP in 1990-91) but
the de¿cit shrank in 1992 and 1993. Later, the current account imbalance widened again,
reaching3-4%ofGDPin1995-1996. InKorea, thecurrentaccountde¿citwaslowintheearly
1990s (1-3% of GDP) and virtually negligible in 1993. However, since 1993 the imbalance
grew very fast, approaching 5% of GDP in 1996. As can be seen from Table 3, these current
account imbalances stemmed primarily from large trade de¿cits, with a relatively small role
played by net factor payments to the rest of the world.
Of the remaining countries, Hong Kong started the decade with large current account
surpluses, averaging over 7% of GDP between 1990 and 1993. Things signi¿cantly worsened
after 1993. In 1994 the surplus shrank to 2% of GDP, and went into a de¿cit of more than 2%
of GDP in 1995 and 1996. In Singapore, very large current account surpluses were observed
throughout the 1990s, averaging about 10% of GDP in 1990-1993 and increasing to about 16%
49 A number of recent contributions on ¿nancial and balance of payments crises provide a discussion of the
issues introduced in this section — among others see Dornbusch, Goldfajn and Valdes (1995), Milesi-Ferretti and
Razin (1996a, b, c), Mishkin (1996), Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) and Roubini and Wachtel (1998).
Among recent studies focusing on the large-scale speculative episodes in the 1990s before the Asian crisis, see
Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993) and Buiter, Corsetti and Pesenti (1998a, b) on the European Monetary Systyem
crisis of 1992-93, and Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) on the Mexican peso crisis of 1994.
4: The Economist, Dec.23 1995-Jan.5 1996, pp. 46-48.
4; While the two series should in principle be equivalent, quantitative differences can arise because of incon-
sistencies in the data collection processes.14
of GDP in 1994-96. In China, the current account was in surplus (1.5% of GDP) in 1990-92,
but turned into a 2% de¿cit in 1993. After 1993, the current account experienced a modest
surplus averaging 1% of GDP. Finally, Taiwan’s current account was consistently in surplus
in the 1990s, with the 1996 ¿gure showing a large surplus of over 4.5% of GDP.
Data on the current account positions provide some preliminary evidence that the
currency crises may have been associated with an external competitiveness problem. In fact,
as a group, the countries that came under attack in 1997 appear to have been those with
large current account de¿cits throughout the 1990s in 1997 the appreciation of the US dollar
relative to the currencies of the high-de¿cit countries Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, Korea
and Indonesia reached 78%, 52%, 52%, 107% and 151% respectively.
Instead, countries with smaller de¿cits or actual surpluses did not suffer comparable
depreciations. China h a ds t a b l ec u r r e n c yv a l u e si n1 9 9 7( ad e p r e c i a t i o no f2 % ) .T h eHong
Kong parity against the US dollar was aggressively and successfully defended against heavy
attacks during the year. While the exchange rates of Singapore and Taiwan were affected
by the regional crisis, the rate of depreciation in these two countries — about 18% over the
year — was well below that of the crisis countries. Moreover, the depreciations in Singapore
and Taiwan were orderly, and were not characterized by episodes of speculative frenzy and
¿nancial panic such as the ones associated with the currency crises in the rest of the region.
In sum, while the correlation between currency depreciation and external imbalances by
group of countries in the 1990s need not imply causation, prima facie evidence suggests that
current account problems may have played a role in the dynamics of the Asian meltdown.
3.2 Solvency, resource balance gaps, and sustainability
Assessing the sustainability of current account imbalances is not an easy task. In
fact, no compelling criterion exists to determine when current account de¿cits — and the
resultingaccumulationofnetforeignlabilities—reach‘excessive’proportions, thustriggering
devaluation expectations, speculative outÀows, and ¿nancial crises.
The standard theoretical criterion for assessing current account imbalances is the notion
of solvency: a country is solvent to the extent that the discounted value of the expected stock of
its foreign debt in the in¿nitely distant future is non-positive. In other words, a country that is
accumulating foreign debt at a rate that is faster than the real cost of borrowing, cannot expect
to be able to do so forever.
In practice, the solvency criterion is not particularly stringent, because the intertemporal
budget constraint of a country imposes only very mild restrictions on the evolution of a
country’s current account and foreign debt. Any path of the current account such that the
present discounted value of the current and future trade surpluses is equal to the current
externaldebtpositionisconsistentwithsolvency. Acountrycouldrunverylargeandpersistent
current account de¿cits and remain solvent, as long as it can generate trade surpluses (of the
appropriate size) at some time in the future.
19
4< For an updated textbook treatment of solvency see chapter 2 of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996).15
Since the theoretical notion of solvency is rather loose, policy analysts tend to resort
to more practical criteria. A popular ‘test’ of solvency in practical terms is a non-increasing
foreign debt to GDP ratio. It can be easily shown that, under the realistic assumption that in
the long run the interest rate exceeds the growth rate of output, a stable debt to GDP ratio is a
suf¿cient condition for solvency. Based on this condition, then, the criterion of solvency can
be made operational by calculating the so-called ‘resource balance gap’ — in a country where
the debt to GDP ratio is growing, this gap is the difference between the current trade balance
and the trade surplus required to stabilize the debt to GDP ratio in the long run.
20 The gap will
be larger for countries with a large trade de¿cit to GDP ratio, a large debt to GDP ratio, or a
large differential between the real interest rate and the growth rate of the economy.
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To calculate the ‘resource balance gap’, one needs to make assumptions about the long-
run differential between the real interest rate and the growth rate of the economy. There exists
compelling reasons — both at the theoretical and empirical level — to argue that such a
differential is positive in a steady state, regardless of whether negative values are observed
in the short run. A 1% differential between the real interest rate and output growth is a
conservative but realistic assumption.
On the basis of the above assumptions, the trade balance adjustment required to stabilize







T h et a b l es h o w st h a tresource gaps were quite large already in 1996.I t i s w o r t h
emphasizing that we would obtain even larger ¿gures by increasing the permanent interest
rate-growth differential above 1%, or by using the 1997 ¿gures for foreign debt to GDP.
Our calculation is in fact carried out relative to the 1996 (end of the year) stock of foreign
debt, rather than the larger 1997 ¿gure — making our estimates of the resource balance gap
appropriate to assess the pre-crisis imbalances, but very conservative when applied to the
53 To obtain unbiased estimates, the resource balance gap should be computed by considering only the struc-
tural component of the current trade de¿cit. However, in the case of high-growth countries, it is reasonable not to
assign a large weight to cyclical factors. In our estimates below, we take the 1996 trade de¿cit as being entirely
structural.
54 Formally, start from the current account identity Ew.4 @+ 4.u ,E wW w(where E is the net debt position
of the country and W is the trade balance) and divide both sides by current GDP, denoted \w. Assuming that GDP
grows at the constant rate j, so that \w.4@\w @4.j , the previous expression can be rewritten as +4 . j,ew.4 @
+4 . u,ew  w, where e @ E@\ and  @ W@\. For the debt to GDP ratio to be constant in the long run at some
level e, the trade balance surplus (as a fraction of GDP) must be equal to +u  j,e. The resource balance gap is
the difference between the above trade surplus and the currently observed trade balance (both as percentages of
GDP).16
post-crisis scenario, since the 1996 ¿gures do not reÀect the signi¿cant devaluation-induced
increase in the external burden of the countries.
A more thorough assessment of the evidence on current account de¿cits focuses on the
notion of sustainability of the external imbalances. To specify the meaning of ‘sustainability’
in the context of our analysis, consider a country running a current account de¿cit and
accumulating foreign debt relative to its GDP, so that solvency requires the country to run
trade surpluses at some point in the future. We consider a path of current account de¿cits and
foreign debt accumulation sustainable when the reversal in the trade balance consistent with
solvency can be expected to materialize without a sharp change in current policies and/or an
external crisis.
22
The notion of sustainability raises complex macroeconomic and political-economy
issues in the analysis of external imbalances. For instance, sustainability can be related to
both the country’s ‘willingness to pay’, and the creditors ‘willingness to lend’. Willingness to
pay can become an issue when a country is potentially solvent but, as Milesi-Ferretti and Razin
write, “it is not politically feasible to divert output from domestic to external use to service the
debt”.
23 Creditors’ willingness to lend on current terms is a maintained assumption in the
theoretical solvency criterion, but such presumption may not be realistic if, for any reason,
foreign creditors come to believe that the country will renege on its liabilities acting under
this presumption, they will require a higher default premium, or stop lending altogether.
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However, rather than providing a unifying theoretical framework for the study of
external imbalances, the approach based on the notion of sustainability is primarily focused
on the empirical analysis of macroeconomic performances during crisis episodes, in order
to determine under which conditions sharp trade balance reversals are more likely to occur.
In this light, we now turn to the assessment of current account imbalances in the context of
an overview of macroeconomic fundamentals in the Asian region: GDP growth, private and
public savings rate, inÀation, and the degree of openness.
3.3 Output growth
The historical experience of the 1980 debt crisis suggests that there are several practical
reasons why large current account de¿cits may be perceived as sustainable when current
and expected economic growth is high. For a given current account de¿cit to GDP ratio,
higher growth rates imply a slower dynamics of the foreign debt to GDP ratio, and enhance
the country’s ability to service its external debt. In addition, high (actual and expected)
GDP growth may reÀect sustained capital accumulation rates driven by expectations of high
55 An external crisis could come in the form of a currency crisis — a run on the central bank’s foreign
exchange reserves and/or a rapid depreciation of the exchange rate — or a foreign debt crisis — the inability to
obtain further international ¿nancing, or to meet repayments, or an actual default on debt obligations.
56 Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1996a, p. 1).
57 Since the current account is the sum of the trade balance and net factor incomes and transfers from abroad,
sustainability is also affected by the relative weight of these components. For a given level of current account
de¿cit, sustainability may be more problematic if the trade de¿cit is large, as opposed to large negative Àow of
net factor payments from abroad. A trade de¿cit may indicate structural competitiveness problems, while a large
and negative Àow of net foreign income represents the historical remnant of past foreign indebtedness.17
pro¿tability, and high growth might also explain a transitory decline in the saving rate, in
anticipation of higher future income. If this is the case, current account imbalances driven by a
transitory fall in private savings should not be a concern, since future income growth will lead
to increased future savings.
Table 4 presents the growth data in our sample of Asian countries in the 1990s. The
overall picture is quite clear: in all countries, GDP growth rates were remarkably high in the
1990s. Growth rates averaging more than 7% of GDP (sometimes closer to 10%) were the
norm. The exception is the Philippines, where growth rates were low in the early 1990s, but
still averaged 5% after 1994. Only in 1996 did most countries in the region experience a
marginal slowdown in growth for example, the growth rate in Korea fell from 8.9% of GDP
in 1995 to 7.1% in 1996. Accepting the traditional view that a large current account de¿cit
is likely to be sustainable when growth is high, the Asian countries did not appear to have
a sustainability problem. The key question, however, is whether or not the traditional view
provides reliable indications for the diagnosis of the Asian crisis.
Historical experience suggests in fact a more complex picture in which, paradoxically,
high economic growth may make an economy more vulnerable to a crisis.
25 For instance, high
growth rates may induce overly-optimistic beliefs that the economic expansion will persist
unabated in the future. Such expectations can then drive both a consumption and investment
boom, as well as large capital inÀo w st h a tm a k ei te a s yt o¿ nance the increasing demand. In
such circumstances, an external shock that leads to a sudden change in expectations can cause
a rapid reversal of capital Àows and trigger a currency crash.
26
In the speci¿c case of the 1997-98 crisis, this argument is strictly related to the debate
on the causes of the Asian ‘economic miracle’. The issue in that debate is the extent to which
output growth in Asia was due to total factor productivity (TFP) growth, as opposed to growth
in the availability of inputs, reÀecting increasing rates of investment and labor participation
in the region. Krugman (1994) popularized the controversial view — originally advanced by
Young (1992) — that the contribution of TFP to output growth in Asia was less sizable than
commonly believed, suggesting that the very rapid growth that Asia experienced in the past
decades could not be sustainable in the long run, as employment growth and investment were
eventually bound to decline.
Such an interpretive scheme cannot explain the sudden crash of the Asian economies in
1997, since it only predicts a slowdown of growth. Yet, it does point out that, in the period
leading up to the crisis, extrapolating the high rates of growth of the 1990s into the future
was not necessarily warranted by fundamentals. To the extent that savings and investment
decisions were based on unrealistic expectations about long-run output perspectives, the
observed high rates of growth may have contributed to downplaying the riskiness and costs
of a strategy of excessive reliance on foreign capital and current account imbalances.
58 The traditional view does not ¿t, for instance, the cases of Chile in 1979-81 and Mexico in 1977-81,
whereas average real GDP growth rates in the years preceding the crisis were above 7%.
59 Rigobon (1998) develops a model where excessive optimism leads to excessive capital inÀows in ‘good’
times and rapid reversals and market overreaction in ‘bad’ times.18
3.4 Investment rates, ef¿ciency and pro¿tability
Other criteria of current account sustainability focus on the intertemporal decisions
underlying a current account de¿cit. Since the current account is equal to the difference
between national saving and investment, a de¿cit can emerge from either a fall in saving or
an increase in investment. Conventional wisdom holds that borrowing from abroad is less
‘dangerous’ for sustainability if it ¿nances new investment (leading to increased productive
capacity and to higher future export receipts) rather than consumption (which implies lower
saving). For these reasons, a current account de¿cit that is accompanied by a fall in saving
r a t e si sr e g a r d e da sm o r ep r o b l e m a t i ct h a nad e ¿ cit accompanied by rising investment rates.
Underlying such ‘conventional’ conclusions, however, is the implicit assumption that the
return on investment is at least as high as the cost of the borrowed funds. Also implicit is the
assumption that high investment rates contribute to the enhancement of productive capacity
in the traded sector. If the investment boom is con¿ned to the non-traded sector (commercial
and residential construction, as well as inward-oriented services), in terms of sustainability
analysis the contribution of such investment projects to future trade surpluses — thus to the
ability of the country to repay its external debt obligations — is limited to their indirect impact
on the productivity of the traded sector. The two ‘implicit’ assumptions above need not hold
in the Asian case.
Evidence on investment rates in Asian countries is shown in Table 5 (corresponding data
on saving ratios are presented below). Unlike the Latin American countries that experienced
currency and ¿nancial crises in the recent past, the Asian countries were characterized by very
high rates of investment throughout the 1990s. In most countries these rates were well above
30% of GDP (and in some cases above 40% of GDP), with the exceptions of the Philippines
and Taiwan, that show rates in the 20-25% range.
One may of course wonder whether aggregate measures of investment above 40%
of GDP truly represented the real magnitude of productive capital accumulation in these
economies. On the basis of anecdotal evidence, it has been argued in fact that the of¿cial
investment rate measures were likely to be upward biased, as several forms of ‘investment’ in
the Asian economies may have simply been a disguised form of consumption.
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More generally, there are several reasons why such high investment rates should have
been regarded with concern in regards to current account sustainability. Evidence on the
pro¿tability of the investment projects is provided by a standard measure of investment
ef¿ciency, the ICOR or ‘incremental capital output ratio’ de¿ned as the ratio between
the investment rate and the rate of output growth. As bad investments might have been
concentrated in some sectors of the economy (such as real estate and some manufacturing
sectors), an aggregate measure such as the ICOR does not provide information about the
variability of rates of return across sectors. But as a measure of overall investment ef¿ciency,
its level and changes over time provide a broad estimate of the productivity of capital.
5: As suggested by the head of research in a Thai brokerage house: “there is in practice no clear divide
between investment and consumption in Thailand... For example, one very clear example of overinvestment has
been in ¿ve-star or equivalent hotels. Every family business empire feels it has to have one, and to out-do its
friends or enemies in out¿tting it luxuriously. This is just an aspect of that I call ‘conspicuous investment’.”19
Table 6 presents two sets of data, one for the 1987-1992 period and the other for the
1993-1996 period. The data for both periods suggest that investment ef¿ciency is generally
high in the Asian region. However, with the exception of Indonesia and the Philippines,t h e
ICOR had increased sharply in the 1993-96 period relative to the 1987-1992, suggesting that
the ef¿ciency of investments was already falling in the four years prior to the 1997 crisis.
In the case of Korea, evidence of low pro¿tability is also available at the ¿rm level.
In this country, the 1997 crisis was primarily triggered by a series of bankruptcies of large
conglomerates (chaebols) who had borrowed heavily to ¿nance their investment projects. In
1997, and before the currency crisis hit Korea, as many as seven of the top 30 conglomerates
couldbeconsideredeffectivelybankrupt.
28 Theextentofthe¿nancialproblemsofthechaebols
is presented in Table 7 — outlining the assets, liabilities, sales, net pro¿ts and debt-equity
ratios for the top 30 chaebols at the end of 1996. The table shows that the average debt-equity
ratio for the 30 chaebols was 333% (the comparable ¿gure for the US is close to 100%).
Those chaebols that went bankrupt or had severe ¿nancial problems in 1997, tended to have
even larger debt-equity ratios. In the case of Sammi (bankrupt in January), the ratio was a
staggering 3,245%, while in the case of the Jinro group the ratio was 8,598%. The table also
shows that pro¿tability, as measured by net pro¿ts, was very low (or outright negative in the
case of 13 out of 30 companies).
Table 8 shows the return on invested capital (ROIC) in the 1992-96 period for ¿ve of the
bankrupt ¿rms.
29 With a prime rate in local currency that before the crisis was as high as 12%,
the ROIC for these ¿rms was well below the cost of capital in the 1992-96 period (with the
exception of Kia) as well as in 1996 (without exceptions). In the cases of Hanbo, Sammi and
Jinro, the ¿rst chaebols to collapse in 1997, the ROIC at the end of 1996 was as low as 1.7%,
3.2% and 1.9% respectively.
30 Figures on pro¿tability — over the 1990s — were particularly
low for the conglomerates that went bankrupt in 1997, and according to evidence available
during the ¿r s th a l fo f1 9 9 7 ,the ROIC was below the cost of capital for 20 out of the top 30
chaebols. Evidence on the low pro¿tability of investment was also provided by the Interest
Coverage Rate (ICR) — which compares cash Àow earned with interest payments due over a
particular period: 11 out of the 30 top chaebols had an ICR below 1, meaning that earnings
were below interest payments.
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In Korea, most investment projects by the chaebols were concentrated in the
manufacturing sector. However, in other countries overinvestment and overcapacity problems
were concentrated instead in the non-traded sector. The low pro¿tability of these investment
5; See OECD (1998). The shaky conditions of Korean groups had been exhaustively analyzed by the spe-
cialized press before the eruption of the crisis: as an example, see “20 of top 30 groups show poor management
performance,” The Korea Herald, October 7, 1997. We thank Seung Jung Lee for surveying the available infor-
mation.
5< Of the chaebols included in Table 8, only Hanbo and Dainong were not among the top 30 considered in
Table 7.
63 OECD (1998) points out that the return on capital of industrial companies in Korea were below the pre-
tax cost of debt between 1987 and 1995. Data disaggregated by sector show that only the steel industry realized
pro¿ts in excess of debt charges in the 1993-1995 period.
64 See “Essence of Korean corporate crisis”, Korean Economic Brie¿ng, October 23 1997. For a recent
analysis of poor corporate performances in the pre-crisis Asian region see Pomerleano (1998).20
projects can be assessed by looking at the data on Central Business District vacancy rates
a n dr e n t a ly i e l d sp r e s e n t e di nT a b l e9 . A st h et a b l es h o w s ,b e f o r et h eo n s e to ft h ec r i s i s ,
rental yields on of¿ce buildings were already quite low, reÀecting the very high prices of real
estate. In mid 1997, they were as low as 3.5% in Hong Kong and 3.9% in Singapore.T h e
rental yields for other countries were higher but the ¿gures for June 1997 are partly arti¿cial,
because they are based on pre-downturn expected vacancy rates.
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From a different viewpoint, evidence consistent with speculative overinvestment in land
and real estate is provided by data on stock market prices, which in many countries rose more
rapidly in the property sector than in the other sectors over the 1990-96 period. Similarly,
when national stock markets collapsed in 1997,
33 the percentage drop was much sharper in the
property sector than for the overall market.
Data on overall stock market indices in local currency are presented in Table 10, while
Table 11 presents similar data for stock price indices for the property/real estate sector —a l l
data are end-of-year ¿gures. Between 1990 and 1993, the Thai stock market rose by 175%
(395% for the property sector) but then lost 51% (73% for the property sector) of its value
between 1993 and the end of 1996. In Malaysia, stock prices rose by 145% (160% for the
property sector) between 1990 and the end of 1996. In the Philippines, the stock market rose
by 386% (271% for the property sector) between 1990 and 1996. In Hong Kong, stock prices
increased by 344% (423% for the property sector), while in Singapore they rose by 92%
(181% for the property sector), and in Taiwan they rose by 53% (-9,8% for the hotel sector).
In Indonesia, the market rose by 53% between 1990 and 1996, a period characterized by large
volatility in stock prices. Finally, in Korea, stock prices rose by 47% between 1990 and 1994
but then dropped sharply, falling 36% by the end of 1996 as the 1995/96 economic slowdown
hit corporate pro¿tability.
3.5 Private and public savings
In parallel with the assessment of investment rates, the analysis of the dynamics of
private and public savings can shed light on the sustainability of the underlying current account
imbalances. A fall in national savings caused by lower public savings (a higher budget
de¿cit) is typically seen as more disruptive than a fall in private savings.
34 The conventional
underpinning of this view is that a fall in private savings is more likely to be a transitory
65 In 1997 the highest vacancy rates were in Bangkok (15%), Jakarta (10%) and Shanghai (30%).
66 Note that in several countries stock prices had already peaked before 1996 and stock markets were falling
even before the 1997 crash.
67 It is worth recalling that, at a theoretical level, budget de¿cits can cause current account de¿cits even in
economies in which Ricadian equivalence holds. For instance, it is well known that, in a Ricardian world, a
transitory increase in government spending leads to both a budget de¿cit and a current account de¿cit. When
taxes are distortionary and the government follows a tax-smoothing rule, transitory negative output shocks will
also cause both a budget de¿cit and a current account de¿cit.21
phenomenon,
35 while an increase in public sector de¿cits often represents a persistent change
which results in an irreversible build-up of foreign debt.
The issue of understanding the role of public vs. private saving in a current account
crisis is however far from settled, as there are historical examples that are clearly at odds
with the interpretive pattern just described. For example, in the Chilean 1977-81 case, a crisis
occurred in spite of the fact that the ¿scal balance was in surplus. In the more recent Mexican
episode, the deterioration of the current account in the years preceding the 1994 crisis was
largely due to a fall in private savings and a boom in private consumption. Such behavior
was fueled by overly-optimistic expectations about future growth, in an environment in which
the liberalization of domestic capital markets loosened liquidity constraints — suggesting that
current account de¿cits driven by a fall in private saving rates may be a matter of concern even
if such a fall can be interpreted as the result of rational consumption/saving decisions.
Data on saving rates in Asia are reported in Table 12, and somewhat represent the mirror
of the investment rates in Table 5. Asian countries were characterized by very high savings
rates throughout the 1990s — in many cases above 30% of GDP and in some cases above
40%. The lowest rates are recorded for the Philippines, where the saving rate Àuctuated
between 17% and 20%, Indonesia, where the saving rate fell below 30% (to a 28% average)
after 1992, and Malaysia, where the saving rate was below 30% until 1993. Looking at the
data before the crisis, there is little evidence of public dissaving — so that the current account
imbalances do not appear to be the result of increased public sector de¿cits. Table 13 shows
that in most countries the ¿scal balance of the central government was either in surplus or a
small de¿cit. In 1996, only China and Taiwan displayed a central government de¿cit (about
1% of GDP).
Theabsenceof¿scalimbalancesin theyearspreceding thecrisis, however, shouldnotbe
interpreted as pervasive evidence against the ¿scal roots of the Asian crisis. As we document
below, and we model formally in Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998), the pre-crisis years
were a period of excessive credit growth in the banking system, leading to a large stock of
non-performing loans and the eventual collapse of several¿nancial institutions. By early 1998,
the overall cost of ‘cleaning up the ¿nancial sector’ — as put by the First Deputy Managing
Director of the IMF Stanley Fischer — was realistically expected to amount to 15 percent of
GDP for several Asian economies.
36 Ultimately, the restructuring of the ¿nancial sector poses
as e v e r eb u r d e no nt h e¿ scal balances of the affected countries. In terms of our analysis of
current account sustainability, such costs represented an implicit ¿scal liability for the Asian
countries. Such a liability was not reÀected by data on public de¿cits until the eruption of
the crisis, but affected the sustainability of the pre-crisis current account imbalances since
it contributed to generate expectations of drastic policy changes (a ¿scal reform required to
¿nance the costs of ¿nancial bail-outs) or currency devaluations (as a result of higher recourse
to seigniorage revenues).
68 A transitory fall in private savings (corresponding to a transitory increase in consumption) is determined
by expectations of higher future GDP growth raising permanent income. The transitory fall in savings today will
be offset by higher savings in the future, when the anticipated increase in income actually materializes.
69 Fischer (1998 b). By September 1998, the most recent unof¿cial estimates of the ¿nancial restructuring
costs have increased to the 20-30% range.22
3.6 InÀation
InÀation is also important in the analysis of current account and external debt
sustainability. When currency values are ¿xed or semi-¿xed, and domestic inÀation is
above foreign inÀation, a real currency appreciation leads to decreasing cost-competitiveness,
eventually undermining the credibility of the peg. In particular, high inÀation rates may
signal poor macroeconomic policy and/or sizable ¿scal imbalances, generating the need for
seigniorage revenue. In either case, high inÀation signals that the ¿xed or semi-¿xed exchange
rate regime is potentially exposed to speculative attacks.
Table 14 presents the data on inÀation in our sample of Asian countries in the 1990s. The
overall picture is quite clear: in all countries, inÀation rates were relatively low in the 1990s.
The only exceptions were the Philippines where inÀation was close to 20% in 1990-1991(but
falling to 8% by 1996), Hong Kong with an inÀation rate of 11% in 1991 but falling to 6%
by 1996 and China where the inÀation rate was above 10% in the 1993-95 period (averaging
18% per year) but falling to 8% in 1996 and to 3% in 1997.
However, in terms of our sustainability analysis the picture is considerably more
complex. The banking and ¿nancial sector problems experienced by several Asian countries
over the 1990s raised considerable doubts about their ability to keep inÀation low in the near
future. Speci¿cally, these doubts were related to the possibility that the consequences of the
banking sector bail-outs might prompt an increasing use of seigniorage, and would require
infusions of liquidity to prevent systemic runs. For these reasons, the nominal depreciations
of Asian currencies in 1997 were consistent with the expected inÀationary consequences of
banking and¿nancial bail-outs. Ex-post data seem to con¿rm this view: injections of liquidity
into the banking system have occurred in several countries, such as Indonesia and Malaysia,
and inÀationary pressures have emerged in Asia, either explicitly (Indonesia) or masked by
tight price controls (Malaysia).
3.7 Openness
Economies that are relatively open are considered less likely to face sustainability
problems, for two reasons. First, a large export sector (generating foreign currency receipts)
strengthens the country’s ability to service its debt obligation. Second, the economic and
political costs of a crisis are relatively large, as the interdependence of the economy with the
rest of the world is high. Since the costs of a cut-off from international capital markets and
disrupted trade credit may be quite severe, the country is more likely to be willing to honor
its liabilities. Yet, greater openness also makes the country more vulnerable to terms of trade
shocks and to restrictive trade policies in other countries.
Table 15 reports the ratio of the average of exports and imports to GDP, as measures of
t h ed e g r e eo fo p e n n e s so ft h ec o u n t r i e su n d e rs t u d y .A st h et a b l es h o w s ,most Asian countries
were considerably open. T h ed e g r e eo fo p e n n e s si st h el o w e s ti nIndonesia (around 26-27%).
The measures are in the 30-40% range in Korea,t h ePhilippines and Thailand,c l o s et o
50% in Taiwan,a b o v e8 0 %i nMalaysia, and above 100% in the city-states of Hong Kong
and Singapore. It is worth recalling here that signi¿cant negative terms of trade shocks were
experienced by several East Asian countries in 1996 with the fall in price of some of their main
exports (semi-conductors and other manufactured goods).23
3.8 Real exchange rate appreciation
Virtually all analyses of crisis episodes emphasize that a signi¿cant real exchange rate
appreciation may be associated with a loss of competitiveness and a structural worsening of
the trade balance, thus jeopardizing the sustainability of the current account. What was the
role of real exchange rate Àuctuations in the aggregate demand boom and external balance
deterioration observed in the Asian countries prior to the crisis? To what extent were the
current imbalances caused by a misalignment in exchange rates? The evidence is somewhat
mixed, asthedegreeofrealappreciationoverthe1990sdifferedwidelyacrossAsiancountries.
Data on nominal exchange rates in the 1990s are presented in Table 16. In Malaysia,
the currency moved in a 10% range of 2.7 to 2.5 ringgit to the US dollar for most of the
period spanned by 1990 and the beginning of 1997. In Thailand the baht was effectively ¿xed
between 25.2 to 25.6 to the dollar from 1990 until 1997. And in the Philippines during 1990-
95, the peso/dollar rate Àuctuated between 24 and 28, but was effectively ¿x e da t2 6 . 2f r o m
the spring of 1995 until the beginning of 1997.
Other countries followed a somewhat more Àexible exchange rate policy. In Korea,
the won depreciated in nominal terms between 1990 and the beginning of 1993 (from 700 to
almost 800 won per dollar). Between 1993 and mid 1996, it was quoted within a very narrow
range of 800 to 770, and then it depreciated again, reaching 884 won per US dollar by the
end of 1996. The Indonesian policy can be described as real exchange rate targeting, with the
nominal rupiah/dollar rate falling from 1900 in 1990 to 2400 by the beginning of 1997.
Taiwan also followed a policy of real exchange rate targeting, allowing its currency to
fall from a rate of 24 New Taiwan dollars per US dollar in 1990 to a rate of 27.8 by the end
of 1996. And in Singapore, the currency actually appreciated in nominal terms, from a 1990
rate of 1.7 to a rate of 1.4 by the end of 1996. Finally, in China where inÀation was in double
¿gures in the early 1990s, the currency was allowed to depreciate modestly between 1990
and 1993 but was drastically devalued by around 50% in 1994 (substantially bridging the gap
between the of¿cial rate and the swap market rate, at which about 80% of Chinese transactions
were settled). Since then, the currency has remained stable with a slight drift towards nominal
appreciation.
Table 17 presents the data on the real exchange rate of the Asian countries in our
sample.
37 Taking 1990 as the base year, we observe that by the spring of 1997 the real
exchangeratehadappreciatedby19%inMalaysia, 23%inthePhilippines, 12%inThailand,
8% in Indonesia,1 8 %i nSingapore, and 30% in Hong Kong.I n Korea and Taiwan,t h e
currency depreciated in real terms (respectively by 14% and 10%). This suggests that with the
important exception of Korea, all the currencies that crashed in 1997 had experienced a real
appreciation.
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6: The source of these data is the JP Morgan RER series, that goes back to 1970 the base year for the trade
weights is 1990.
6; The magnitude of the real appreciation differs across indicators and sources. The data computed by
Radelet and Sachs (1998) suggest a real appreciation larger than the one presented in this paper. Similarly, the
data computed by Merril Lynch show a larger degree of real appreciation, especially after 1995. Conversely
Chinn (1998) estimates a structural model of real exchange rate determination and ¿nds a lower degree of real
appreciation.24
It should be stressed that in several countries, a large part of the real appreciation
occurred after 1995, in parallel with the strengthening of the US dollar.
39 In fact, the choice
of the exchange rate regime against the US dollar was a key factor in the observed real
exchange rate appreciation.
40 Countries with more rigid policy rules experienced a much
largerreal appreciation. Conversely, countries such asKorea andTaiwan thatfolloweda more
Àexible exchange rate regime experienced a real depreciation. Note that Indonesia,w h i c h
followed a regime closer to real exchange rate targeting, faced a smaller real appreciation than
Thailand, Malaysia, Hong Kong and the Philippines — countries that focused more closely
on exchange rate stability.
T h ed a t aa l s os u g g e s tt h a t ,in general, an exchange rate appreciation was correlated
with a worsening of the current account — countries with appreciating currencies generally
experienced a larger deterioration of the current account, while countries such as China and
Taiwan that had experienced a real depreciation exhibited current account surpluses. The
decision to maintain a stable currency led to large capital inÀows, attracted by favorable
interest rate differentials and expectations of low exchange rate risk. The resulting strong
real appreciation helped build the region’s large and growing current account imbalances. The
exception was, once again, Korea, which displayed current account de¿cits together with a
currency that depreciated in real terms over the 1990s.
Is it possible that the observed movements in relative prices reÀected a change in the
equilibrium real exchange rate, rather than a misalignment? First, high rates of productivity in
the tradables sector relative to the non-traded sectors may lead to real appreciation, along the
lines of the Balassa-Samuelson model. Second, even when the Balassa-Samuelson argument
does not apply, models of exchange rate-based stabilization programs suggest that the typical
investment and consumption booms that follow a successful inÀation stabilization program
m a yl e a dt ob o t ha ni n c r e a s ei nt h er e l a t i v ep r i c eo fn o n - t r a d e dt ot r a d e dg o o d s( ar e a l
appreciation), and a worsening of the current account — see Rebelo and Vegh (1995) and
Calvo and Vegh (1998).
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The question of whether the real appreciation observed in Asia was the result of a
misaligned exchange rate or an equilibrium real appreciation is open, but there are reasons to
be skeptical of explanations that rely too much on a change in the equilibrium exchange rate.
First, evidence for a Balassa-Samuelson effect in Asia is slim. Second, the Asian countries
do not ¿t the story of an exchange rate-based stabilization starting from high inÀation. One
of the key reasons why many Asian countries pursued a policy of an effective peg against
6< The US dollar appreciated sharply in the months leading to the crisis. Between 1991 and 1995, the US
dollar had followed a downward nominal trend relative to the yen and the mark, reaching a low of 80 yen per
dollar in the spring of 1995. After the spring of 1995, the dollar started to appreciate very rapidly: the yen/dollar
rate appreciated 56% between the spring of 1995 and the summer of 1997.
73 Only Hong Kong had actually a currencyboardwith the parity tied to that of the US dollar. Other countries
were formallypeggingtheir exchange rate to a basket of currencies however, the effective weightof the US dollar
in the basket was so high that their policies could be characterized as an implicit peg to the US currency.
74 Strictly speaking, the exchange rate stabilization models presented in the literature do not provide an
equilibrium explanation of the stylized facts on real appreciation and current account de¿cits after a stabilization.
Their numerical simulations show that a good ¿t of the data requires the introduction of some form of price/wage
inertia (see Rebelo and Vegh (1995)). But this inertia is consistent with the view that a real appreciation represents
a misalignment relative to fundamental values.25
the dollar was to facilitate external ¿nancing of domestic projects. The cost of borrowing fell
because a credible peg led to a reduction of the currency risk premium charged by international
investors. This policy was consistent with a strategy of sustaining high investment rates, which
were supposed to translate into high rates of productivity and output growth. Most crucially,
the loss in competitiveness (i.e. the increase in the relative price of exports) experienced by the
Asian countries that pegged their currencies to the US dollar was particularly relevant when
the value of the dollar soared after mid-1995.
It is worth emphasizing that movements in the real exchange rates are not necessarily
dependable measures of changes in external competitiveness, since this can also suffer from
shocks that do not translate in a relative price increase. The misalignment of Asian currencies
was exacerbated by a number of these shocks. First, the long period of stagnation within
the Japanese economy led to a signi¿cant slowdown of export growth for its Asian trading
partners. Close to the onset of the crisis, the abortive Japanese recovery of 1996 was
overshadowed by a decline in activity in 1997, triggered by the introduction of a consumption
tax in April 1997. Second, the increasing weight of China in total exports from the region
enhanced competitive pressures in many Asian countries — an argument that holds regardless
of whether such pressures were magni¿ed or not by the devaluation of the Chinese currency
in 1994. Third, as mentioned above, sector-speci¿c shocks such as the fall in the demand for
semi-conductors in 1996, together with deteriorating terms of trade for several countries in
the region, caused a further signi¿cant slowdown in export growth in 1996-97. And ¿nally,
expectations of a US monetary tightening in the summer of 1997 may have also played a role
in precipitating the crisis.
3.9 Political instability and policy uncertainty
The threat of a change in regime or a regime that is not committed to sound
macroeconomic policies can reduce the willingness of the international ¿nancial community
to provide current account ¿nancing. So a deterioration in expectations about the political
and ¿nancial environment can contribute to a balance of payments and exchange rate crisis,
especially when economic fundamentals are not very comforting. Such shifts in expectations
can occur quickly and without warning. Moreover, political instability may lead to larger
budget de¿c i t st h a t ,i na no p e ne c o n o m y ,m a yl e a dt ol a r g e rc u r r e n ta c c o u n td e ¿ cits.
42
In this regard, there was plenty of political instability in Asia. Focusing on 1997
alone: the cabinet reshufÀes, and eventual government collapse in Thailand the ranting by
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir against “rogue speculators” and international “morons”
the elections in Indonesia, the tensions, the reiterated bad news about the health of the
Indonesian president Suharto, and his policy reversals the presidential campaign in Korea
and the contradictory signals sent by then candidate (and eventually President elect) Kim Dae
Jung the threat of labor unrest in the region these were all factors that added to the seriousness
of the crisis and triggered the domestic and foreign investors’ Àight.
75 For a formal model of how political instability may exacerbate a ¿scal and current account de¿cit, see
Corsetti and Roubini (1997). For a systematic study of political inÀuences on macroeconomic policy, see Alesina,
Roubini and Cohen (1997).26
Throughout the crisis, market expectations reÀected and reacted to political and policy
uncertainty in the region. The ¿rst round of the IMF plans were signed but not seriously
implemented by governments. Regardless of whether the initial IMF plans were appropriate,
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it is clear that governments failed to enforce even the most sensible components of such plans.
In Indonesia, a corrupt and authoritarian regime effectively ignored most of its agreed-upon
commitments until the severe deterioration of macro conditions led to a fully Àedged collapse
and the free fall of the rupiah. The currency board ‘saga’ following the second IMF plan
and the continued resistance of the Indonesian governments to macro and structural reforms
were important elements of the ¿nancial demise experienced by Indonesia. For the case of
Korea, there were serious doubts about the implementation of the ¿rst IMF plan, given the
coming elections in December and the broad policy uncertainty associated with that event. In
Thailand, it was only with a new government truly committed to economic reforms that the
value of the baht stabilized, and even appreciated relative to the lows reached in December.
4 . T h er o l eo ft h e¿ nancial system
The previous section has highlighted a number of country-speci¿c and global factors
that determined the current account imbalances observed in Asia on the eve of the crisis, and
undermined their sustainability. In this section, we argue that the key to a comprehensive
interpretation of the events leading to the Asian meltdown of 1997 is the analysis of the
structure of incentives under which not only the corporate but also the banking and ¿nancial
sectors operated in the region.
The links between balance of payments crises and banking crises in emerging economies
represent a recurrent theme in the policy literature, and they have been (re)emphasized in a
number of recent studies.
44 For instance, the origins of the 1994 Mexican crisis and its impact
on other countries in the region have been traced to, inter alia, an excessive build-up of bank
credit and a lending ‘boom’ that represented the outcome of ¿nancial market liberalization.
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Jeffrey Sachs has presented an early analysis of the role of excessive lending driven by ‘moral
hazard’ incentives:
“Throughout Latin America, Central Europe and South-East Asia, banks have
been deregulated and privatized in recent years, allowing them much greater
latitude to borrow from abroad. Banks and near-banks — such as Thailand’s
now notorious ¿nancial trusts — become intermediaries for channeling foreign
capital into the domestic economy. The trouble is that the newly liberalized banks
and near-banks often operate under highly distorted incentives. Under-capitalized
banks have incentives to borrow abroad and invest domestically with reckless
abandon. Ifthelendingworksout, thebankersmakemoney. Ifthelendingfails, the
depositors and creditors stand to lose money, but the bank’s owners bear little risk
themselves because they have little capital tied up in the bank. Even the depositors
76 See the discussion in section 7.
77 See e.g. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1997), Goldfajn and Valdes (1997).
78 See in particular Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996).27
and the foreign creditors may be secure from risk, if the government bails them out
i nt h ec a s eo fb a n kf a i l u r e . ”
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In the overview that follows, we provide evidence on the degree and extent of
‘overlending’ in Asia, and comment upon its consequences and implications for the unraveling
of the 1997-98 crises.
4.1 The evidence on ¿nancial ‘overlending’: quantity...
Evidence on the lending boom in the 1990s is provided by the data on the growth of
bank credit to the private sector (Table 18) and the ratio of private sector lending to GDP
(Table 19). Also, as in Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996), in Table 20 we provide a synthetic
measure of the lending boom by calculating the rate of growth of bank lending as a percentage
of GDP ratio in the 1990s. The IMF distinguishes between ‘deposit money banks’, ‘other
banking institutions’ and ‘other ¿nancial intermediaries’, but information about the latter two
categories is missing for many countries. We therefore focus our analysis on ‘deposit money
banks’ and refer to other intermediaries when data are available.
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The ratio of private sector lending to GDP shows an upward trend in all the countries
in our sample. Between 1990 and 1996, the magnitude of the lending boom was largest in
the Philippines (151%), Thailand (58%) and Malaysia (31%). It is also large but more
modest in Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Indonesia. And the measure was the smallest
in China (7%). For a comparison with Mexico and the ‘Tequila effect’ countries, between
1990 and 1994 the lending boom in Mexico, Argentina and Brazil was 116%, 57% and 68%
respectively.
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How do our results on the lending boom change when we consider available data on
lending by ‘other banking institutions’ and ‘non-bank ¿nancial institutions’? In the case of
Korea, the measure of lending growth is not altered signi¿cantly. For Malaysia,d a t ao n
‘other banking institutions’ are available only for the 1992-95 period, while data on ‘non-bank
¿nancial institutions’ are available only for the 1990-94 period. The growth rate of credit
from such institutions appears to be similar to that of commercial banks. In the Philippines
lending by ‘other banking institutions’ was more modest than lending by commercial banks,
but overall lending by such institutions was a small fraction (about 10%) of bank lending.
79 Financial Times, July 30 1997. Along the same lines, a celebrated early analysis of the emergence of a
¿nancial crisis in an emerging economy is provided by Diaz-Alejandro (1985). Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini
(1998) formalize these insights in the context of the analysis of the Asian collapse.
7: For a general assessment of the moral hazard argument in Asia, one should consider that ¿nancial deregu-
lation led to the emergence of new non-bank ¿nancial intermediaries (such as the ¿nance companies in Thailand),
and that these companies often played a key part in the lending boom. Unfortunately, detailed data on lending by
all ¿nancial intermediaries are not available.
7; These ¿gures on Latin America are from Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996). Note that they use a slightly
different de¿nition of lending boom, as they consider total lending to the private sector by both banks and the
central bank. The difference between the two de¿nition is is not signi¿cant, as in most countries central bank
credit to the private sector is very modest.28
In Singapore, the credit growth of ‘other banking institutions’ and non-banks was very
close to that of commercial banks, so that the overall lending boom pattern is con¿rmed by this
extension of the analysis. In Thailand, the lending boom was signi¿cantly larger for ¿nance
and securities companies than for banks (133% as opposed to 51%) moreover, the non-bank
share of lending to the private sector was quite signi¿cant (about 33% of bank lending). So,
Thailand is the only country in the sample where lending to the private sector is very different
if we add the ‘other banking’ and ‘non-bank ¿nancial institutions’ ¿gures. Data for ‘other
banking’ and ‘non-bank ¿nancial institutions’ are not available for Hong Kong, China and
Taiwan.
In summary, the evidence suggests a sustained lending boom in the Philippines,
Thailand and Malaysia. Note that these were also the ¿rst countries to be hit by currency
speculation in 1997.
4.2 ...and quality
The growth rate of the lending to GDP ratio gives an indication of the quantity of loans.
But one of the main problems faced by the countries in our sample is that many loans made
by banks and non-banks were of low quality, ¿nancing investment of dubious pro¿tability or
speculative purchases of existing ¿nancial assets. In the investment section above, we have
already shown evidence suggesting overinvestment in risky and poorly performing projects.
We can now add to the picture evidence on the quality of pre-crisis lending, by looking at the
proportion of non-performing loans to total loans. Since the 1997 crisis may have crippled
otherwise healthy loans, it is appropriate to refer exclusively to data on non-performing loans
at the onset of the crisis.
As reported in Table 21, the pre-crisis share of non-performing loans as a proportion of
total lending can be estimated at 13% for Thailand, 13% for Indonesia,8 %f o rKorea,1 0 %
for Malaysia, 14% for the Philippines and 4% for Singapore. The estimated share is 3-4%
for Hong Kong and Taiwan, and 14% for China.
49 Although the reliability of these estimates
varies across countries, the ¿gures show a strong correlation between the amount of bad loans
and the extent of the currency crises.
Westresstheimpactoftherealestatesectorcrisisonthe¿nancialpositionofthebanking
sector. Table 22 presents end-1997 estimates of property exposure, collateral valuation, non-
performing loans and capital of local banks, all as a share of total assets. Property exposure
is estimated to be very high in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, while it
is relatively low in the Philippines and Korea (where the bad loans were concentrated in
manufacturing ¿rms). By the end of 1997, non performing loans of local banks were the
highest in Indonesia (11%), South Korea (16%) and Thailand (15%). As the table shows,
they are expected to increase sharply in 1998 in all Asian countries, and become especially
problematic in Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand and Malaysia. In these four countries, banks
were also severely under-capitalized, with capital to asset ratios as low as 6-8%. Note that, at
the end of 1997, this ratio was already below the share of non-performing loans, a share that
is expected to worsen in the current year.
7< See Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998) for details.29
The table clari¿es the links between high shares of bad loans, an excessive exposure
to the property sector, and overly-optimistic estimates of the loans’ collateral. In the four
countries with the most severe problems, the of¿cial collateral valuations were in the range
of 80 to 100% of assets.
50 Asset deÀation and the sharp drop in the value of the collateral,
especially real estate, triggered the irreversible surge in the shares of non-performing loans.
4.3 Banking problems, ¿nancial deregulation, and institutional de¿ciencies
In the Asian region, with bond and equity markets relatively underdeveloped, most
¿nancial intermediation occurred through the banking system. This meant that the capital
inÀows ¿nancing the region’slarge currentaccountde¿cits were largely intermediated by local
banks. Speci¿cally, domestic banks borrowed from foreign banks and then, in turn, lent on to
domestic ¿rms, so that when domestic ¿rms experienced ¿nancial dif¿culties, domestic banks
were faced with non-performing domestic assets and short-term foreign-currency liabilities.
Such ‘overborrowing’ and ‘overlending’ syndromes within the undercapitalized banking
systems were the outcome of severe institutional and policy de¿ciencies. T h e r ei si n d e e d
overwhelming evidence that the Asian banking and ¿nancial systems were very fragile —
poorly supervised, poorly regulated, and in a shaky condition even before the onset of the
crisis.I n Thailand, regulation of commercial banks limited their credit expansion, but
¿nancial liberalization in the 1990s led to the emergence of other largely unregulated non-
bank intermediaries that could circumvent credit limits. Moreover, Thai policies provided
strong tax-incentives to offshore borrowing. In the 1990s, Thai ¿nance companies sharply
accelerated their lending to the real estate and property sector, mainly¿nanced with borrowing
from foreign ¿nancial institutions.
In Korea the ¿nancial system was in a severe crisis because of excessive lending to
large traded-sector conglomerates, a number of which went bankrupt before the currency
crisis hit in late 1997. It should be noted that, in several cases, private banks in Korea were
effectively controlled by chaebols, giving those conglomerates privileged access to credit and
exacerbating the moral hazard problem.
In Indonesia, although of¿cial prudential requirements for domestic banks were in line
with Basle Committee recommendations, compliance and enforcement were low. According
to central bank statistics, from a total of 240 banks in April 1996, 15 did not meet the required
8% capital adequacy ratio, 41 did not comply with the legal spending limit, and 12 out of 77
licensed foreign exchange banks did not meet the rules on net overnight positions.
While in the 1980s the banking system had been dominated by ¿ve large state-owned
banks, accounting for 80-90% of all bank credit, in the 1990s — following a wide-ranging
series of reforms in 1988/89 — the private banking sector grew rapidly, surpassing the state
sector by 1994. Overall, banks accounted for almost two-thirds of total corporate ¿nance,
while stock markets provided one third. Rapid growth within this deregulated system, along
with the struggle for market shares, resulted in a system containing an excessive number of
small undercapitalized banks (a problem pointed out by IMF economists in November 1996,
83 The source is JP Morgan.30
and also highlighted by Standard & Poors in January 1996), which was vulnerable to poorly
chosen or fraudulent lending.
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Rather than shutting down ailing banks — only one, Bank Summa in 1992, had ever
been liquidated — the Indonesian government’s preferred course of action was to encourage
mergers, or other forms of support.
52 With such government support in prospect, the incentives
of small undercapitalized banks were clearly biased toward riskier projects. The asset quality
of state banks was even worse than that of private banks, due to their even greater con¿dence in
government support (the Finance Ministry announced in 1994 that it would not permit a state
bank to default on its obligations), or to their greater susceptibility to government direction in
their lending patterns. As of end-1995, state banks had an average non-performing debt level
of 17%, compared to 5% for the private sector as a whole.
Until 1995, Malaysia’s banking problems were not as serious as Indonesia’s, but there is
evidence of excessive lending in highly risky projects, which escalated in 1996 and early 1997.
Recognizing that Malaysia had too many small banks to be internationally competitive, Bank
Negara had been steadily urging consolidation of the banking sector. In 1996 the proportion
of non-performing loans to total credits dropped to 3.9% from 5.5% in 1995, due to recoveries
associated both with economic growth and write-offs. But 1996 witnessed an overall increase
in bank lending by 27.6%, with a sharp switch from lending to the manufacturing sector to
lending for equity purchases: growth in lending to the manufacturing sector fell to 14% in
1996 (from 30.7% in 1995), while growth in lending for share purchases accelerated to 20.1%
(from 4% in 1995).
By the end of 1996, the banking system’s exposure to the property sector and equities
stood at 42.6% of total credits, compared to 21% for manufacturing ¿nance. Over the year,
the increased availability of loans drove up asset prices, with the price of up-market properties
in major Malaysian cities growing by 25% in 1996. Property and equity ¿nancing continued
to rise rapidly in early 1997. The Malaysian central bank eventually intervened to slow the
growth of lending for real estate speculation and equity purchases, but these actions were too
little, too late. Only on March 1997 did Bank Negara announce ceilings on lending to the
property sector and for purchases of stocks and shares.
84 The most spectacular case of poor lending emerged with the rescue of Bank Bapindo, a government
development bank, which had built up a overwhelming portfolio of non-performing loans, and had lent USD 420
million to an obscure businessman who absconded after being jailed with other Bapindo of¿cials for corruption.
Similarly, Lippo Bank faced a bank run in November 1995, following reports that it had not disclosed its exposure
to sister companies in the Lippo group — companies that had been involved in highly speculative real estate
ventures. The bank was rescued by a group of private banks which agreed to provide short-term liquidity.
85 In April 1996, Bank Negara Indonesia was told to ‘nurse’ two ailing banks closely af¿liated with Suharto’s
family — Bank Yama, owned by President Suharto’s eldest daughter, and Bank Paci¿c, run by the daughter of
the founder of the state-run oil monopoly Pertamina.31
5. Imbalances in foreign debt accumulation and management
5.1 The foreign debt burden and the role of short-term external debt
An otherwise solvent country may suffer a short-run liquidity problem when the
available stock of reserves is low relative to the overall burden of external debt service (interest
payments plus the renewal of loans coming to maturity). Liquidity problems emerge when
panicking external creditors — perhaps in response to rapid devaluation — become unwilling
to roll over existing short-term credits. So, if a large fraction of a country’s external liabilities
are short-term, a crisis may take the form of a pure liquidity shortfall — the inability by a
country to roll-over its short-term liabilities. The experience of Mexico with its short-term
public debt (Tesobonos) in 1994-95, and of several Asian countries with private external
liabilities in 1997 provides striking examples of liquidity problems.
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Comparable estimates of the debt-service burden and the external liabilities of the Asian
countries are available from three sources. The ¿rst is the World Bank, which provides annual
estimates of the external debt of developing countries.
54 The second source consists of two
series of data published by the BIS. One BIS series
55 is published quarterly and presents
data on the liabilities and assets of domestic agents (both domestic banks and non-banking
institutions, i.e. private ¿rms and other large public sector agents) towards the BIS reporting
banks. The other BIS series
56 is published every six months and contains consolidated data
on liabilities toward BIS banks, including their maturity — allowing for a precise measure of
short-term lending from BIS reporting banks to a particular developing country. Finally, the
OECD also collects yearly data on the external liabilities of developing countries.
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If we use the estimates developed by the World Bank, it is hard to notice any serious
problems for the countries hit by the crisis. As can be seen from Table 23, the debt-to-GDP
ratio for many of these countries was relatively low and growing only modestly, or else high
but actually falling during the 1990s. In Korea, the ratio was around 14% between 1990 and
1995. It was relatively high in Indonesia in 1991 (68%), falling to 57% by 1996 in Malaysia,
it gravitated around 40% since 1993. In the Philippines, the ratio fell from a high 69% of
GDP in 1991 to 53% in 1995. In Thailand, it barely moved from 33% of GDP in 1990 until
86 At a theoretical level, a number of recent analyses emphasize that a relatively large share of short-term
debt makes the occurrence of self-ful¿lling debt crises more likely (see Cole and Kehoe (1996) and Sachs, Tornell
and Velasco (1996)).
87 The World Bank data on long-term debt are quite precise but its estimates of short-term debt, especially
the external liabilities of the banking system, are less reliable. Moreover, the World Bank measure of the debt-
servicingratiohasseriousshortcomings as itincludes interestpaymentsonallforeigndebtbutprincipalpayments
only for long-term debt — so the roll-over of short term liabilities that was an essential issue in the 1997 Asian
crisis is not considered. Also, the annual World Bank data are published with considerable delay (usually one
year and often two years).
88 These are the data in the BIS publication International banking and ¿nancial market developments.
89 This is the BIS publication The maturity, sectoral and nationality distribution of international bank lend-
ing.
8: The OECD estimates of long-term debt are comparable to those of the World Bank however, the OECD
estimates of short-term liabilities are closer to those provided by the BIS.32
1996, while in Singapore and Taiwan external debt was practically non-existent.
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for China grew from 14% in 1990 to 18% in 1994 but still remained relatively low.
World Bank ¿gures also suggest that the share of short-term debt was relatively modest,
albeit growing (see Table 24): about 25% in Korea in 1994 25% in Indonesia in 1996, up
from 16% in 1990 28% in Malaysia in 1996, up from 12% in1990 1 9 %i nt h ePhilippines
in 1996 41% in Thailand in 1996 (although it was over 70% in 1995) and 20% in China in
1996. As for the debt service ratio, the World Bank estimates for the Asian countries in our
sample are also quite low, as they do not include the roll-over of short-term liabilities. The
debt service ratio is de¿ned as the interest on all debt plus the principal to be repaid on long-
term debt as a share of total exports. During the 1990s, this debt-service ratio was well below
10% in many countries of the region (see Table 25). Exceptions were Indonesia, with a ratio
above 30% the Philippines, with a ratio which started above 20% but fell to 16% by 1995
and Thailand, with a ratio as high as 13% until 1994, but down to 11.6% by 1995.
The picture looks somewhat more troubling if we consider the ratio of short-term debt
to foreign reserves, and the ratio of debt-service plus short-term debt to foreign reserves. If a
liquidity crisis occurs, foreign reserves must be large enough to cover a country’s debt service
obligations (including the roll-over of short-term debt). The ¿gures corresponding to the two
ratios described above are presented in Tables 26 and 27. By the latest available data (1996
for all countries except Korea, for which data refer to 1994), these ratios were: 54% and 85%
for Korea 177% and 294% in Indonesia 41% and 69% in Malaysia 79% and 137% in the
Philippines 100% and 123% in Thailand 24% and 38% in China.
We look next at quarterly BIS data on the external assets and liabilities of domestic
banks and non-banks towards BIS reporting banks. Table 28 presents the data on a country-by-
country basis, while Table 29 reports the ratio of total liabilities to GDP for all countries in the
sample. First, by comparing Tables 23 and 29, we note that for Korea and Thailand foreign
liabilities of domestic agents towards BIS banks are larger than the World Bank estimates of
total foreign debt. This observation suggests that the World Bank estimates, especially those
of domestic agents’ liabilities towards foreign banks, may be seriously biased downward.
The second point to note is that, in most countries, foreign liabilities towards BIS
reporting banks are liabilities of domestic banks, as opposed to liabilities of the corporate
or public non-bank sector. For example, by the second quarter of 1997, about 77% of all
Korean liabilities towards BIS banks concerned domestic banks. This con¿rms our previous
observation that a large fraction of Asian borrowing from foreign banks was intermediated by
the domestic banking system. In mid-1997 the ratio of intermediation handled by domestic
banks was 77% for Malaysia, 69% for the Philippines, 86% for Thailand, and 78% for
China. The only country with signi¿cant external borrowing by non-banks was Indonesia,
where the ratio for banks was 39%.
It is worth pointing out that the banking share of total liabilities is quite different if we
use the second set of data published by the BIS, as presented in Table 30. According to the
8; Data on Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan are from the Asian Development Bank, since these countries
are not considered as developing by the World Bank, and therefore are not included in the debt tables provided
by this institution. Since 1996, the World Bank also stopped reporting data on Korea, after this country was
promoted to the status of developed OECD country. In tables 23-27, the source for Korean data in 1995 and 1996
(in italics) is the OECD the lack of homogeneity between the World Bank and the OECD estimates is transparent.33
latter ¿gures, in mid-1997 the banks’ liabilities represented 44% of the total in Korea,3 8 %
in Thailand,2 1 %i nIndonesia,3 6 %i nMalaysia,6 2 %i nTaiwan and 43% in China.
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Hong Kong and Singapore exhibit a very large ratio of foreign liabilities to GDP as well as
a large ratio of foreign assets to GDP their net external liabilities towards BIS banks appear
to be quite large but these two countries are very important international ¿nancial centers, so
external liabilities toward BIS banks need not be representative of their overall liabilities.
For the other countries in the sample, foreign liabilities tend to be very large, even after
netting out foreign assets. For example, in the case of Korea external liabilities increased
from USD 45 billion in 1993 to USD 116 billion in 1997: after subtracting foreign assets, we
still observe a net debt as high as USD 30 billion in 1993, reaching USD 80 billion in 1997.
As discussed above, most of these net liabilities are by Korean banks (about USD 57 billion
by mid-1997), but the liabilities of non-banks are sizeable as well (about USD 23 billion).
For other Asian countries, both gross and net liabilities are large and growing rapidly in the
1990s. In Indonesia, gross liabilities grow from USD 37 billion in 1993 to USD 60 billion in
1997, while net liabilities are as high as USD 49 billion in 1997. Similar trends are observed
in Malaysia,t h ePhilippines and Thailand. In the latter country gross (net) liabilities grow
from USD 34 billion (29 billion) in 1993 to 98 billion (90 billion) in 1997.
Table 31 reports the ratio of foreign liabilities to assets relative to BIS reporting banks.
This ratio is above unity for all crisis countries, and deteriorates severely in the 1990s. In an
extreme case, Thailand, it reaches 1,103% in 1996. In Korea, it is 297% in 1993, and reaches
375% in 1996 — the same patterns emerge if we focus on foreign liabilities and assets of
domestic banks only. In 1996, equally worrisome ratios are observed in Indonesia (424%),
the Philippines (172%), Hong Kong (165%), Singapore (162%) and Malaysia (148%).
Conversely, the ratio is lower in China (120%). The case of Taiwan is interesting as it is
the only country in our sample that has a net positive assets position (the ratio is lower than
unity). Net assets are equal to USD 12.2 billion in 1997, 7.5 billion for the Taiwan banking
system alone.
The above ¿gures suggest a serious mismatch between foreign liabilities and foreign
assets of Asian banks and non-bank ¿rms. Domestic banks borrowed heavily from foreign
banks but lent mostly to domestic investors. In normal times a high ratio of foreign liabilities to
foreign assets may not cause concern, as short-term foreign debts are easily rolled-ever. In the
presence of a rapid currency depreciation, however, this imbalance may cause serious¿nancial
problems (especially if the foreign borrowing is in foreign currency while the domestic lending
is in domestic currency). Foreign lenders may suddenly refuse to roll over short-term lines of
credit to domestic banks, precipitating a credit crisis. To a large extent, this is what happened
in 1997.
8< The two series differ in a number of aspects: the quarterly series include liabilities towards BIS banks in
Singapore, Hong Kong and other offshore centers, something missing in the other series. The quarterly series
distinguishes only between non banks and, residually, bank liabilities towards BIS banks while the other presents
data for non-bank private sector, public sector and bank liabilities. The quarterly data present data both on assets
and liabilities towards BIS banks. The other series has the bene¿t of presenting consolidated cross-border claims
in all currencies and local claims in non-local currencies. These differences lead to quite different ¿gures for
total liabilities and very different data for the banking and private sector share of such liabilities. For the sake of
completeness we present both series even if we focus on the quarterly data.34
The BIS ¿gures on foreign liabilities appear particularly problematic when we consider
their maturity structure. This piece of information is presented in Table 32. By the end of
1996, a share of short-term foreign liabilities above 50% was the norm in the region. The
percentage of loans with a maturity of up to one year was 67% in Korea,6 5 %i nThailand,
61% in Indonesia, 50% in Malaysia, 58% in the Philippines, 49% in China,8 4 %i nTaiwan,
82% in Hong Kong and 92% in Singapore. Of the latter three countries, however, Taiwan was
a net creditor, while the data for Hong Kong and Singapore reÀect the role of these countries
as large ¿nancial and intermediation centers.
5.2 Foreign exchange reserves
The existence of large foreign exchange reserves facilitates the ¿nancing of a current
account de¿cit, and enhances the credibility of a ¿xed exchange rate policy. Foreign exchange
reserves and a small external debt burden reduce the risk of external crises, and enable a
country to ¿nance a current account de¿cit at lower costs. The real rate paid (in hard currency
terms) on the country’s debt is an indication of the market’s evaluation of the country’s ability
to sustain a current account de¿cit.
A traditional measure of the adequacy of foreign exchange reserves is the stock of
reserves in months of imports (of goods and services) — this measure is reported in Table
33. As rapid outÀows of speculative money have become a more important source of foreign
exchange pressure than trade imbalances, the above indicator is no longer regarded as a good
measure of reserve adequacy. A better indicator of adequacy is the ratio of money assets to
foreign reserves, since in the event of an exchange rate crisis or panic, all liquid money assets
can potentially be converted into foreign exchange. Calvo (1998) suggests the ratio of a broad
measure of liquid monetary assets to foreign reserves, for instance — as in Sachs, Tornell and
Velasco (1996) — the ratio of M2 to foreign reserves.
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Tables 34 and 35 report both the ratio of M1 to foreign reserves (M1/FX) and the ratio
of M2 to foreign reserves (M2/FX). For the purpose of comparison, it is worth recalling that,
just before the Mexican peso crisis (November 1994), M2/FX was equal to 9.1 in Mexico, and
equal to 3.6 in both Brazil and Argentina — the two countries that were most affected by the
‘tequila effect’.
In most Asian countries the ratio between M2 and foreign reserves was dangerously high
in 1996-97.I nKorea, this ratio was equal to 6.5 by the end of 1996, and rose to almost 7 in the
¿rst quarter of 1997. In Indonesia M2/FX constantly rose throughout the 1990s and reached
ap e a ka sh i g ha s7 . 0 9i n1 9 9 5 .I nMalaysia, the ratio was a bit lower, but increasing from 2.9
in 1990 to 3.7 at the end of 1996. In the Philippines the ratio declined marginally from 4.8 in
1991 to 4.5 in 1996. In Thailand the ratio went from 4.5 in 1990 to 3.9 in 1996. In Singapore,
the ratio was as low as 1.2 in 1990, and fell further to 1.03 in 1996. And ¿nally, in 1996, the
ratio was at 4.2 in Hong Kong, and at 8.5 in China.
The ¿gure for the M1 to reserves ratio are smaller, reÀecting the importance of ‘Quasi
Money’, included in M2 but not in M1. At the end of 1996, the M1 to reserve ratio was above
93 A problem in interpreting the evidence is that the ratio of M2 to GDP varies a great deal across countries,
dependingonthe developmentofthe bankingsystemandthe levelof ¿nancialintermediation. The M2toreserves
ratio may be high because banking intermediaries are relatively more developed.35
unity inChina (3.45), Korea (1.44), Indonesia (1.21), andMalaysia(1.16) It was belowunity
in Singapore (0.25), Hong Kong (0.35), Thailand (0.44), and the Philippines (0.89). Note
that while China had the highest ratios, the ability of Chinese residents to convert domestic
liquid assets into foreign currency is severely limited by widespread capital controls that are
absent in most of the other countries in the region.
Toprovide anotherindicatorof¿nancial fragility, Table36reportsthe ratio oftotal short-
term external liabilities (towards BIS banks) to foreign reserves at the end of 1996. This ratio
was 213% in Korea, 181% in Indonesia, 169% in Thailand, 77% in the Philippines, 47% in
Malaysia and 36% in China.T h e s e¿ gures mean that, by the end of 1996, in the event of a
liquidity crisis with BIS banks no longer willing to roll-over short-term loans, foreign reserves
in Korea, Indonesia and Thailand were insuf¿cient to cover short term liabilities, let alone
to service interest payments and to repay the principal on long-term debt coming to maturity
in the period. When we add interest and long-term principal repayment, the Philippines and
Malaysia would have also found it impossible to meet their external obligations.
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5.3 Composition and size of the capital inÀows
As noted above, current account sustainability is enhanced when the de¿cit is largely
¿nanced by foreign direct investment (FDI), relative to a de¿cit mainly ¿nanced by short-
term Àows that may be reversed if market conditions and sentiments change. InÀows from
of¿cial creditors are more stable and less subject to sharp reversals in the short-run than
t h o s ef r o mp r i v a t ec r e d i t o r s loans from foreign banks are less volatile than portfolio inÀows
(bonds and non-FDI equity investments). External sustainability also depends on the currency
composition of a country’s foreign liabilities. Borrowing in foreign currency is generally
associated with greater capital inÀows at a lower interest rate than issuing debt denominated in
domestic currency (since risk averse investors concerned about inÀation and exchange rate risk
prefer foreign-currency denominated assets). However debt denominated in foreign currency
may end up exacerbating an exchange rate crisis, as the depreciation of the local currency
increases the real burden of foreign debt.
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Table37showstheextenttowhichAsia’scurrentaccountimbalanceswere¿nancedwith
non-debt creating long-term FDI Àows. There is a wide range of experiences. Some countries
such as Korea and Thailand ¿nanced only a small and falling fraction of their current account
de¿cits with long-term FDI. By 1996, this fraction was 10% for Korea and 16% for Thailand.
Other countries relied much more on FDI —i nIndonesia,F D Ii n À ows were 60-90% of the
current account de¿cit between 1992 and 1995, whereas in Malaysia the ratio was well above
100% in 1992-1993, but then fell to about 90% in 1994-1995. In the Philippines,t h er a t i ow a s
quite volatile in the 1990s, but on average FDI covered 45% of the current account de¿cit.
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94 The OECD data con¿rm the above analysis of the growth of short-term debt.
95 In the experience of Mexico in 1995, the depreciation of the peso in the presence of a large amount of
short-term dollar denominated Tesobonos generated a liquidity crisis that almost turn into a default crisis.
96 In countries such as Korea and Thailand, there were also considerable FDI outÀows, so that the net contri-
bution of FDI to the ¿nancing of the current account was smaller than suggested by the gross ¿gures. Speci¿cally,
Korean FDI outÀows were greater than inward FDI in each year of the 1990s. By 1996 FDI outÀows were USD
4.4 billion, while FDI inÀows were only USD 2.3 billion. In Thailand, net FDI Àows were positive but by 199636
Another important point to consider is that net capital inÀows different from FDI
(portfolio assets, bonds, portfolio equity, bank borrowings) were often large enough, relative
to the current account de¿cit and net FDI Àows, so that the overall balance of payments was
in surplus — producing a net accumulation of foreign exchange reserves.
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on international reserves is shown in Table 38. For all countries in the region, the growth
of foreign reserves between 1990 and 1996 was quite remarkable — 127% in Korea,
144% in Indonesia, 176% in Malaysia, 985% in the Philippines,1 7 6 %i nSingapore,
183% in Thailand, 159% in Hong Kong, and 261% in China. To the extent that these
interventions were sterilized, domestic interest rates remained high and capital inÀows did
not fall, maintaining the upward pressure on the exchange rate.
6. A reconstruction of the Asian crisis
Inthe¿rstsectionsofthepaperwehavecarriedoutadetailedanalysisofmacroeconomic
indicators at the onset of the Asian collapse in 1997. In this section we present a reconstruction
of the unfolding of the crisis, in the context of our assessment of the evidence on structural
distortions in the Asian region.
The discussion of how the crisis erupted in 1997 is preceded by a country-by-country
overview of the build-up of macroeconomic pressures in the region. This overview is focused
on the years 1995 and 1996, the period in which the macroeconomic outlook of Southeast Asia
was subject to rapid deterioration.
6.1 The period leading to the crisis: 1995-96
In Thailand, the year 1995 witnessed a further increase of the current account de¿cit,
that had risen from 5.7% in 1993 to 6.4% in 1994 and 8.4% in 1995. When GDP growth
slowed down in 1996, the current account fell even further, up to 8.5% of GDP. By the end of
1996, the macroeconomic conditions of Thailand appeared to be very shaky: large external
de¿cits, increasing short-term foreign indebtedness, fragile ¿nancial conditions of corporate
¿rms and ¿nance companies that had heavily borrowed abroad to ¿nance the speculative boom
in real estate and equity investments. It is worth stressing that the Thai baht came under attack
already in November and December 1996.
In Indonesia, an acceleration of growth in 1995 brought along worrisome signs of
overheating: the inÀation rate remained high, while the country’s trade surplus suffered a
sharp drop. The government response was initially very timid: a mildly deÀationary budget
and a modest tightening of monetary policy. The Bank of Indonesia (BI) raised interest rates
throughout 1995, and increased reserve requirements for commercial banks from 2% to 3%
in January 1996. In September 1996, the BI announced that the reserve requirements would
FDI outÀows were as high as USD 1 billion, against inÀows for USD 2.3 billion. So, in 1996, the net contribu-
tion of FDI to the ¿nancing of Thailand’s current account was 9%, much smaller than the gross contribution of
16% as reported above.
97 As a reminder, Current Account + Net FDI + Other Net Capital InÀows = Change in Foreign Reserves.37
further increase to 5% in April 1997. The bank also intensi¿ed its efforts to moderate the
expansion of bank credit by resorting to moral suasion.
Like many other Asian countries in a similar situation, the BI faced an awkward
balancing act: it was aiming at dampening domestic demand, but was reluctant to increase
domestic interest rates signi¿cantly, in the fear that higher rates would fuel further capital
inÀows and appreciate the currency. In an effort to reduce the effects of a monetary contraction
on capital inÀows, the BI widened the rupiah’s trading band from 2% to 3% around the daily
mid-rate, hopingthattheadditionaltradingriskofholdingtherupiahwouldoffsettheincentive
toinvestindomesticassetsprovidedbythehigherinterestrates. Thebandwas furtherwidened
from 3% to 5% in June 1996, and again from 5% to 8% in September 1996. But the broader
bands did little to discourage capital inÀows, as expectations of higher interest rates pushed
the rupiah upward on each of these occasions.
Apart from these moves, the government’s only other response was a promise to increase
its efforts to improve the ef¿ciency and competitiveness of the export sector. This promise was
met with widespread skepticism, especially when assessed in the light of a number of actual
high-pro¿le initiatives that the government undertook in the period.
65 These initiatives raised
serious doubts on the government’s willingness to address the country’s pressing economic
problems, and, according to a private Hong Kong survey of expatriate businessmen in March
1997, earned Indonesia the dubious honor of the “most corrupt country in Asia”.
The current account de¿cit had widened between 1993 and 1995 also in Malaysia,
reaching 8.8% GDP in 1995. Notably, in 1994 and 1995 foreign direct investment failed to
cover the full amount of the de¿cit. In 1995 there was asurgeinpublic investment, which grew
by 25% because of a series of large infrastructure projects designed to facilitate Prime Minister
Mahathir’s goal of earning Malaysia the status of industrialized country by 2020 (“Vision
2020”). The government dismissed concerns that such a goal was placing too great a burden
on the country’s resources and skills, pointing at the low CPI growth rates as evidence that the
economy was not overheated. In contrast with this of¿cial view, a number of commentators
stressed that Malaysia was an open economy with effective price controls on items that were
heavily weighted in the CPI basket. In this case, overheating would be more likely to translate
into a deterioration of the trade balance, rather than an increase of the price level. And the
trade balance was indeed deteriorating, moving from a virtual balance in 1993 to a de¿cit as
high as 3.75% of GDP in 1995.
Efforts by members of the government to slow expenditure on these projects were
actively blocked by the Prime Minister, who appeared to view the projects as symbolic of
98 In February 1996, for instance, the heavily indebted Asri Petroleum group — established under contro-
versial circumstances by a group of prominent local businessmen including Suharto’s son, Bambang Trihatmodjo
— was given signi¿cant tariff support, fueling worries of increased costs for downstream producers. In the same
month, Suharto inaugurated a National Automobile Program, in which quali¿ed ‘pioneer’ ¿rms would be exempt
from sales tax and tariffs on imported components. The only ¿rm to qualify was an obscure company owned by
Suharto’s youngest son Hutomo (Tommy) Mandala Putra, which had entered into an agreement with the Korean
¿rm Kia, but had yet to produce a single car. To make the true intention of the government even clearer, it was
announced that the exemptions would not be extended to any other car manufacturer for a period of three years,
even if these met the quali¿cation criteria. By the same token, when in December 1995 the ASEAN Free Trade
Area deadline for trade liberalization was brought forward to 2003, Suharto insisted on a list of exemptions for
goods such as cloves, rice, wheat Àour, and sugar, most of which were supplied by lucrative monopolies owned
by Suharto’s family or their close associates.38
the government’s resolve. With little help on the ¿scal side, the Malaysian central bank, Bank
Negara (BN), implemented a number of restrictive measures. It placed administrative controls
on consumer lending for cars and houses in October 1995, and tightened reserve requirements
on Malaysian banks. Furthermore, BN cautiously took advantage of any weakening in the
ringgit to raise interest rates. Like Indonesia, the bank tried to walk a ¿ne line, hoping to
restrain domestic demand without repeating the experience of 1992/93, in which BN halted
a rush of speculative inÀows by introducing restrictions and penalties on domestic ringgit
accounts and short-term debt instruments held by non-residents. Most of these measures had
been dismantled by 1995.
By the end of 1996, concern about overheating had eased. Despite the high rate of
public investment, growth had marginally slowed down from 8.2% to 8%. To a large extent,
this slowdown reÀected a marked drop in the rate of export growth, which fell from 20.9% in
1995 to 7.3% in 1996. But the most important change that materialized toward the end of 1996
was in the market sentiment towards Malaysia as an investment opportunity — foreign fund
managers had come to the conclusion that Malaysian interest rates were too attractive to be
ignored. In 1996, short-term capital inÀo w ss u r g e dt oM $ 1 1 . 3b i l l i o n ,c o m p a r e dt oa ni n À ow
o fM $ 2 . 4b i l l i o ni n1 9 9 5a n da no u t À ow of M$8.4 billion in 1994. Malaysia also experienced
an overall increase in bank lending as high as 27.6%, with a sharp switch from lending to the
manufacturing sector to lending for equity purchases. The availability of property loans drove
up asset prices: over the year, the price of up-market properties in major Malaysian cities grew
by 25%.
Korea experienced a serious deterioration of the macroeconomic conditions already in
1995-96. The current account de¿cit dramatically widened from 1.5% of GDP in 1994 to
4.8% in 1996, leading to an unprecedented accumulation of short-term foreign debt. Export
growth fell sharply, especially after negative terms of trade shocks hit the economy in 1996.
The 1996 growth rate of industrial production halved relative to the previous year. On average,
the pro¿tability of the large Korean chaebols, characterized by very high debt/equity ratios,
was low and falling. The ¿nancial conditions of the conglomerates and their creditor banks
were shaky, raising the possibility of widespread bankruptcies reÀecting such weaknesses, the
stock market fell sharply in the two-year period 1995-96, down by 36% relative to the 1994
peak. The won also weakened during 1996.
Relative to the other countries in the region, macroeconomic conditions were more solid
in the Philippines. Years of structural and macro reforms under IMF supervision had put
this economy on a sustainable growth path, albeit lower than some of the neighbors. The
government had privatized or was in the process of privatizing the national airline company,
the electric power systems, and banks and water supplies. The government’s budget was in
surplus. Bad bank loans were at a rate of only 3.4 percent by the end of 1996. Nevertheless,
the current account de¿cit was large, and the currency had signi¿cantly appreciated in real
terms. A very rapid lending boom to the private sector had fueled investment in risky projects,
as well as a speculative boom in the property sector.
6.2 Financial distress in the ¿r s th a l fo f1 9 9 7
By early 1997, macroeconomic conditions had seriously deteriorated in most of the
region. We have already mentioned that, in the 1990s, ¿nance companies in Thailand39
experienced an explosive growth of lending to the real estate and property sector, mostly
¿nanced by borrowing from foreign ¿nancial institutions. Troubled ¿nancial institutions were
receiving of¿cial backing. For instance, in the ¿rst quarter of 1997 the central bank’s Financial
Institutions DevelopmentFund (FIDF)had lentoverUSD8bn, 17.5%ofwhich to FinanceOne
— at the time, the largest ¿nance company in the country — alone.
It should be noted here that this public intervention implied a very large injection of
liquidity in the economic system. After a Thai company (Somprasong) missed payments on
foreign debt in February 1997, the Thai government on March 10 of¿cially stated its intention
to buy USD 3.9bn in bad property debt from ¿nancial institutions (a promise that, as discussed
below, was then to be reneged upon in June).
A closer look at the government management of the bankruptcy crisis allows us to assess
the role of moral hazard and government bail-out guarantees in facilitating the accumulation of
foreign loans by domestic ¿nancial institutions. Although most of the evidence is anecdotal,
the analysis of a few cases can shed light on more general behavioral patterns. The best
known is the case of Finance One. Few months before its collapse, ING Bank in Thailand had
approved a loan to the company as part of a USD 160m syndication led by the World Bank’s
International Finance Corporation. According to ING sources, concerns about the viability of
Finance One were simply dismissed by the Bank of Thailand, which made explicit reference
to a promise of bail-out in case the company had ¿nancial problems.
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Despite the government-declared intentions to intervene in defense of Finance One, the
task of saving this company was particularly dif¿cult and demanding. As reported by the
Financial Times, “nearly two-thirds of the company’s loans were in three problem areas —
property, hire purchase and stock margin lending. As interest rates rose and the economy
slowed, Finance One’s non-performing loans doubled in 1996, then doubled again in the ¿rst
quarter of 1997. Meanwhile, the terms of Finance One’s assets and liabilities were the most
mismatchedofanyofthetop10¿nancecompanies. Itheldsubstantialstakesinseveralsmaller
¿nance and securities companies which themselves were even more vulnerable to the dual
pressures of high interest rates and a falling stock market.”
On May 23 the government made an attempt to save Finance One via a merger with
another ¿nancial institution. As this attempt failed and the company became effectively
bankrupt, the FIDF stepped in and of¿cially promised to buy new shares in Finance One.
It was only one month later, in June, that the public commitment to support Finance One, or
any troubled company, was of¿cially abandoned. What happened in June?
Reportedly, on June 25 (the same day when information was leaked that the government
would stop supporting Finance One) the new ¿nance minister ‘discovered’ that the stock of
international reserves effectively available was a tiny fraction of that of¿cially stated. During
the spring, USD 28bn out of USD 30bn in international reserves had been committed in the
course of forward market interventions to defend the value of the baht. The government
suddenly realized that the overall costs of defending both the domestic value of the ¿nancial
99 As quoted in the Financial Times, 1/12/98, Jan Cherim, Country Manager for ING Bank in Thailand, said:
“Every time we saw the Bank of Thailand they would tell us ‘Finance One is OK, we’re backing it all the way’.
When they didn’t you had to question just about everything they had ever told you”.40
¿rms and the external value of the currency were overwhelming and unsustainable, given the
available ¿scal and quasi-¿scal resources.
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The strong speculative attack on the baht that followed forced Thailand to let the
currency Àoat on July 2, a key date in the chronology of the Asian crisis. However, the
domestic ¿nancial turmoil was just at its beginning. On August 5, when the Thai baht had
already depreciated by 20%, Thailand unveiled a plan to revamp the ¿nance sector as part of
a more general plan agreed upon with the IMF. At that time, the central bank suspended 48
¿nance ¿rms that were already effectively bankrupt. Eventually, 56 ¿nance companies went
bankrupt and were forced to close. Despite the timing of the bankruptcy, it should be stressed
that a large number of these Thai ¿nancial institutions were bankrupt well before the currency
crisis, when the sharp depreciation driven by ‘investors’ panic’ increased the burden of their
foreign liabilities.
By the same token, the beginning of the Korean crisis took place well before the
speculative attack on the won in late October and the ‘¿nancial panic’ that developed in
November and December. In early 1997, Korea was shaken by a series of bankruptcies of its
large conglomerates, the aforementioned chaebols, which had heavily borrowed in previous
years to ¿nance their grand investment projects. The macroeconomic indicators in early 1997
fullyreÀectedtheextentofthis crisis: thecurrentaccount de¿cit wasincreasing, exportgrowth
was falling, and industrial production growth rates were way below previous levels.
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During 1997, Korea suffered a bankruptcy crisis shaking the large domestic
conglomerate sector.
69 As a general pattern, the chaebols that went bankrupt or had severe
¿nancial problems in 1997 had above average debt-equity ratios.
70 The string of bankruptcies
and ¿nancial distress that affected the Korean corporate sector in 1997 translated into serious
¿nancial dif¿culties for the banking system, hitting especially the merchant banks. These
9: Although the press already reported the intention to suspend operation in support of Finance One on June
25, it was only two days later that this intention translated into an of¿cial position of the central bank. On June
27, Finance One and other 15 cash-strapped ¿nance companies were ordered to submit merger or consolidation
plans.
9; The severity of the crisis in early 1997 was already apparent in press accounts of Korea’s economic out-
look. For example, as early as February 1997, the New York Times reported: “South Korea is now gripped by a
deep unease about its future. Economic growth is slowing, the stock market is near a four-year low, the Korean
won has sunk to its lowest exchange rate against the dollar in a decade, and the trade de¿cit has more than dou-
bled in the last year. Banks are hobbled by bad debt, businesses strangled in red tape, and wages are soaring,
weakening industrial competitiveness. Suddenly, it seems to Koreans, the era of fast growth is ending, endan-
gering hopes that their country will make the leap from industrialization to a high-technology economy on a par
with the United States and Japan. The sense of crisis has been punctuated by two events in the last month — the
nationwide strike in reaction to a new labor law that threatens job security, and the stunning collapse of Hanbo
Steel, Àagship of the nation’s 14th largest conglomerate, under nearly $6 billion in debt and a cloud of corruption.
‘Most people don’t think it’s a cycle but that structurally something is wrong,’ said Kim Pyung Koo, a professor
of economics at Sogang University in Seoul.”
9< The string of bankruptcies started in January 1997 when Hanbo Steel, the 14th largest chaebol, sought
court receivership. Hanbo steel was soon followed by Sammi Steel, the main ¿rm of Korea’s 26th largest con-
glomerate, that also sought court receivership in March. In April, the Jinro Group, the 19th largest conglomerate,
defaulted on some liabilities to ¿nancial institutions. In July, it was the turn of the Kia group, the 8th largest
chaebol, that failed to pay USD 370m worth of liabilities and was put under protection.
:3 See section 3.4.41
banks had heavily intermediated external funds, borrowing in foreign currency and lending to
domestic chaebols in domestic currency.
As opposed to Korea, the heart of ¿nancial dif¿culties in Malaysia was the real estate
sector. Facing a booming speculative bubble in real estate and equity lending, Bank Negara
waited very long — perhaps too long — before intervening. It was only on March 1997,
that BN announced ceilings on lending to the property sector and for purchases of stocks and
shares.
71 Yet the Bank added that it would be amenable to delays in the submission of these
plans and stressed that it was not asking banks to call in credits. The impact of these measures
on the KLCI stock exchange index (which is heavily weighted toward property and ¿nancial
shares) was immediate, and caused foreign investors, led by US fund managers, to start selling
their stocks. Within a week of the announcement, the index had dropped 6.6%, and was 17.2%
lower than the peak of February 25. By May 15, as the assault on the Thai baht took hold, the
K L C Ih a df a l l e nt oa1 6 - m o n t hl o w .
In Indonesia, despite the structural problems outlined above, signs of overheating did
a b a t ei n1 9 9 6l e a d i n gt h eB It oc u tr a t e sb y0 . 5 %i nD e c e m b e r1 9 9 6 ,a n da g a i nb y0 . 5 %i n
March 1997, inthehopetomoderatetheinÀowofcapital, toease thedebtburdenonstruggling
Indonesian ¿rms, and to foster exports. In the meantime, however, Indonesian companies kept
borrowing very heavily in international capital markets. As late as December 24 a report
indicated that total Indonesian debt was likely to be closer to USD 200 billion, almost twice
as much as the government’s of¿cial ¿gure, USD 117 billion. This report estimated that the
government data ignored the bulk of short-term off-shore borrowings. International ¿nancial
markets and institutions suddenly learned that the full extent of total foreign borrowing by the
Indonesian corporate sector was underestimated by USD 67billion.
6.3 The policy response to the 1997 currency crises
ReÀecting the macroeconomic conditions in the region, national stock markets started
to drop and currencies came under speculative pressures in the ¿rst months of 1997. The ¿rst
currency to come under attack in the spring was the Thai baht, the currency of the country
with the shakiest economic fundamentals. Once the baht started to depreciate in July 1997,
the currencies that came under speculative pressure were those of countries with economic
fundamentals and export structure similar to the ones of Thailand. These countries were
Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. By the end of July, the baht had fallen by 25%
relative to the beginning of the year, the rupiah by 9%, the ringgit by 4%, and the peso by
10%. In August, the baht fell further, depreciating by 34% relative to its January value by
the end of August, relative to the beginning of 1997 the rupiah had fallen by 27% , the ringgit
by 17% and the peso by 14%. The scenario of contagious devaluations, with a fall of one
currency inducing further plunges of other ones, continued in September. After another round
of currency adjustment in this month, the baht was 42% below its January level, the rupiah
37% below, the ringgit 26% below and the peso 29% below.
:4 Effective April 1, new lending to these sectors was not to exceed 15% of total lending for commercial
banks, and 30% from merchant banks. Also, all banks were required to limit the proportion of their outstanding
loans to the property sector to 20% (not including low-cost housing, infrastructure, and industrial buildings and
factories). They were given until April 15 to submit detailed plans as to how this would be achieved.42
The key to understand the sharp devaluations of these currencies during the summer is
the conduct of monetary policies before the crisis and after the ¿rst round of depreciations.
The ¿rst reaction by monetary authorities to speculative pressures in the foreign exchange
market was to avoid a signi¿cant monetary contraction and a signi¿cant increase in domestic
interest rates. So, in response to speculative pressures in the spring, Thailand and the other
countries in the region at ¿rst sterilized their intervention in the spot and forward markets.
Once such a strategy turned out to be ineffective, Thailand tried to discourage capital outÀows
with the introduction of limited capital controls aimed at segmenting the onshore and offshore
markets,
72 while leaving the domestic monetary stance untouched. Needless to say, under such
circumstances, controls could do very little to stop the speculative Àows.
The stance of monetary policy in the region remained quite loose well into the crisis.
Despite the initial round of sharp depreciations, for many weeks national monetary authorities
were determined not to let domestic interest rates increase. It is only when the fall of the
currencies accelerated after the end of the summer that a serious monetary tightening started
to be implemented. Notably, Malaysia waited until early December, when the ringgit had
already fallen by over 40%, to change its of¿cial monetary stance and renounce its policy of
low interest rates.
A policy of low rates in the presence of strong speculative attacks on the currency in
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, can only be understood in the light of
the fragile ¿nancial conditions that we discussed in the previous sections. Central banks
were held back by the concern that high interest rates would worsen and compromise the
¿nancial conditions of highly indebted banks, ¿nancial institutions and corporations. An
interest rate increase would have led to a further slowdown in output growth. Given the
fragility of both the banking system and the corporate sector, a monetary tightening would
have led to a credit squeeze, corporate and banking bankruptcies, and further negative effects
on the level of economic activity. Well before the onset of the crisis, several governments
were engaged in an extensive policy of bailing out ¿nancial institutions. Such a policy was by
itself a source of monetary creation,
73 and in any case a bail-out strategy was hardly consistent
with a contractionary monetary stance that would have only pushed more ¿rms into ¿nancial
dif¿culties, and increased the ¿scal bill of the government.
A relatively loose monetary policy with the goal of preventing further¿nancial problems
for ¿rms and banks was of course a very risky strategy. As it turned out, it eventually induced
a continuous spiral of currency depreciations that dramatically increased the real burden of
the foreign-currency liabilities. The depreciation jeopardized the very ¿nancial viability of
¿nancial and non-¿nancial ¿rms which a loose monetary policy was meant to preserve, while
increasing the cost of bail-out well beyond the ¿scal means of these countries.
Onlyafter the currencies hadfallenconsiderably —and after the increase in real external
liabilities had pushed a signi¿cant fraction of ¿rms into ¿nancial dif¿culties — did monetary
authorities switch to tight monetary and credit conditions. However, the impact of such a late
tightening turned out to be negative. Instead of restoring market con¿dence, the monetary
contraction induced a credit squeeze that increased the amount of bad loans, exacerbated the
:5 Later in the spring, Malaysia introduced limits on swaps by nonresidents not related to commercial trans-
actions. see IMF (1997).
:6 For instance, in Thailand, liquidity injections surpassed USD 8bn in the ¿rst quarter of 1997.43
¿nancial problems of banks and ¿rms, and had a sharp deÀationary effect on the level of real
economic activity.
6.4 Policy spillovers and contagion effects
By the end of the summer, the combined effective devaluation of about 30% in three
months for the currencies of Thailand, Indonesia,t h ePhilippines and Malaysia had a strong
negative impact on the other currencies in the region. For instance, the Singaporean currency
t h a tw a sf o r m a l l yo naÀ oat started to depreciate on the wheel of the sharp deterioration of
the ringgit — the currency of its close neighbor and trading partner Malaysia. By the end of
September, the Singaporean currency had lost 8% of its value relative to the beginning of 1997.
The speculative pressure in October ¿rst affected Taiwan,t h e nHong Kong, but not
the Korean won. Since during the 1990s the won had depreciated by about 15% in real
terms (relative to its 1990 level), Korea had suffered less from the devaluations in the region,
in comparison to Singapore and Taiwan. Most importantly, the won had been on a gently
declining path in 1996 and had lost another 8% of its value between the beginning of 1997 and
the end of September.
Things were different for Taiwan. Initially, the Taiwanese currency seemed to be
unaffected by the crisis for three reasons: ¿rst, relative to the Asean-4 countries, the
composition of its exports was more oriented towards high value-added high-tech goods
second, the country was running a current account surplus and had large foreign exchange
reserves third, the Taiwanese dollar had been allowed to depreciate in real terms during
the 1990s. However, the markets mood changed in October. Concerns about the loss of
competitiveness in Taiwan had already grown stronger as the magnitude of the depreciation
of the other currencies in the region kept increasing through September. The key factor
was however the decision by Singapore to allow a depreciation of its currency. Since the
composition of Singaporean exports is very close to that of Taiwan — the two countries
producing similar high-tech commodities
74 — the Singaporean move was perceived as an
important threat to the competitive position of Taiwan. By early October, the Taiwanese
currency was subject to severe speculative pressures.
In principle, Taiwan had enough reserves to engage in an extensive defense of its
exchange rate parity — its stock of foreign reserves was over USD 100bn. Nonetheless, in
mid-October, the Taiwanese authorities preferred to let the currency Àoat, as they saw no point
in defending a parity that in the previous months had signi¿cantly appreciated in real terms
relative to the currencies of¿ve regional competitors. After the switch to aÀoat, the Taiwanese
currency lost 5% of its value (by October 20).
The devaluation of the Taiwanese dollar generated expectations that Hong Kong would
follow the example of Taiwan, changing its ¿xed peg to the US dollar. Several considerations
:7 In 1997, the percentage shares of semiconductors and some related capital goods (industries 200 to 216)
in total exports of Asian countries to the US were: 19 (Greater China), 54 (Korea), 83 (Singapore), 57 (Taiwan),
10 (Indonesia), 61 (Malaysia), 54 (Philippines), 37 (Thailand). During the same year, the percentage shares of
apparel, footwear and household goods (industries 400 to 420) were: 69 (Greater China), 19 (Korea), 5 (Sin-
gapore), 27 (Taiwan), 53 (Indonesia), 28 (Malaysia), 32 (Philippines), 39 (Thailand). See Fernald, Edison and
Loungani (1998) for an analysis of these data.44
could justify a depreciation of the Hong Kong dollar. First, during the 1990s the Hong Kong
dollar had appreciated by over 30% in real terms, and the trade balance had exhibited a large
structural de¿cit since 1995. Second, by late October the average depreciation of Thailand,
Malaysia, Indonesia and Philippines had approached 40%. Despite the differences in the
export mix of these countries relative to Hong Kong, such a large change in relative prices
was indeed applying further competitive pressures on Hong Kong. Third, both Singapore
and Taiwan had depreciated their currencies, and the export mix of these countries was
very close to that of Hong Kong.
75 Finally, the reuni¿cation with China over the summer
had introduced an element of political risk. On the basis of the above considerations, the
contagious speculative attack against the Hong Kong dollar in late October should not be
interpreted as a form of irrational speculation. The currency of Hong Kong was overvalued,
and there were several fundamental reasons to expect a correction.
Another serious misperception of the Hong Kong experience is the idea that the
successful defense of the parity was due to the presence of a currency board. The Hong Kong
success in avoiding a collapse of its currency under the strong speculative attack of October
had less to do with the fact that the country had a currency board, and more to do with the fact
that the monetary authorities were willing to drastically increase short-term interest rates.
Because of a very severe monetary tightening, these rates reached extremely high peaks in
both nominal and real terms, preventing an escalation of the capital outÀow, and eventually
convincing international markets about the credibility of the Hong Kong commitment to keep
its exchange rate parity ¿xed.
We observed above that while the currency crisis was spreading throughout the region,
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the Korean won had been spared from speculative pressures. By the end of October, a policy
of gradual adjustment in the parity had led the won to a very contained depreciation of 14%
relative to December 1996 (only 8.4% since July). This implied that, relative to the currencies
of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, the won had appreciated by 37%, 36%,
20% and 15%, respectively. Moreover, Singapore and Taiwan (which competed directly with
Korea in a wide range of export products) had allowed their currencies to depreciate more
substantially than the won this had put Korea — a country in a serious economic crisis since
the middle of 1996, as discussed in the previous sections — at a rather severe competitive loss.
In November the won plunged, depreciating by 25% during the month (corresponding to
a 39% depreciation over the year). This rapid fall did not only worsen the domestic ¿nancial
crisis, but eventually led to the arrangement of a USD 60b IMF-led rescue package in early
December. As Korea was the largest economy in the region, it negatively affected the external
position of all the other countries in the region. Another round of depreciations followed: the
collapse of the Korean currency in November and December was matched by a continuous
decline of the Taiwanese and Singaporean dollar, and a further drop in the value of the
currencies of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines.
:8 Market comments at the time expressed clearly how the fall of the Taiwan dollar would have had conta-
gious repercussions. As put by John Bender, vice president at HSBC James Capel, “the biggest thing to scare
Hong Kong was the devaluation in Taiwan.”
:9 By the end of October 1997, the Thai baht haddepreciated relative tothe US dollar by 55%, the Indonesian
rupiah by 54%, the Malaysian ringgit by 34%, the Philippines peso by 33%. Relative to the beginning of the year,
also, the Taiwan dollar had depreciated by 11.8% (10.4% since July) and the Singapore dollar by 12.5% (10%
since July).45
Once the real burden of the gross borrowing by banks and non-banks was worsened by
the depreciation of the currency, and some ¿nancial institutions went bankrupt, foreign banks
that had heavily lent to Korean banks started to refuse to roll-over their loans, loans that would
have been automatically renewed in normal times. The unwillingness of foreign banks to roll-
over normal lines of credit in the face of a high perceived risk of bankruptcy made the prospect
of loan default more likely, according to a well-known pattern of self-ful¿lling expectations.
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The ¿nancial panic that ensued in December led to a 40% currency collapse in just a week.
The situation calmed down only at the end of December 1997 when the American, European
and Japanese banks jointly agreed to negotiate an orderly renewal of short-term loans and the
major creditor countries decided to anticipate the disbursement of a fraction of the bail-out
package approved by the IMF in early December.
A case in part similar to the Korean one was that of Indonesia in January 1998. In this
month, the continued plunge of the Indonesian currency together with the refusal by foreign
lenders to roll over short-term debts rendered domestic borrowers unable to service their
foreign debt. Indonesia then imposed an effective moratorium on the service of the liabilities
of its corporate sector. The problem of arranging an orderly roll-over of liabilities was much
more complicated in Indonesia than in South Korea. In Korea, most of the short-term BIS
loans were concentrated to a limited number of domestic¿nancial institutions. Thus, the small
number of concerned parties made the dif¿cult problem of negotiating the roll-over of loans
(and/or their transformation into medium term loans) relatively manageable. In Indonesia,
instead, the negotiation represented a much more daunting task, as it involved a very large
number of domestic ¿rms that had borrowed directly from BIS banks and/or in international
debt markets.
6.5 The role of Japan
What was the role of Japan, the leading regional economy, in the crisis? At the beginning
of 1996 it appeared that the economy was recovering after ¿ve years of near zero growth,
but with the increase in the consumption tax in April 1997 Japan fell into another economic
recession: the level of activity actually declined in the second and third quarters. Clearly,
the economic weakness in Japan contributed to the crisis in terms of a reduced demand for
imports from the region. As Japanese authorities kept monetary policy loose and interest rates
extremely low, the continued depreciation of the yen relative to the US dollar since the middle
of 1995 exacerbated the exchange rate tensions in the region, and in 1997 caused a steep real
appreciation of the Asian currencies that were pegged to the dollar. The crisis ¿nally exploded
in the summer, when the dollar went through what seemed an unstoppable rise and the yen
continued its decline.
It is important to stress that Japanese banks, already in fragile conditions after the burst
of the 1980s asset bubble and weakened by a stagnant economy in the 1990s, had heavily lent
to other Asian economies given the very low interest rates in Japan, large scale lending to the
fast-growing East Asian countries wasstimulated by the higherreturns available outside Japan.
As the Japanese crisis deepened in 1997, many of these banks suffered capital losses and were
requiredtore-balancetheirloanportfolioinadherencetocapitaladequacystandards. Sincethe
:: See e.g. Chang and Velasco (1998 a, b), in which the classic Diamond and Dybvig (1983) framework is
applied to the study of ¿nancial crises in emerging economies.46
capital adequacy requirement is higher for international than for national lending, many banks
chose to recall foreign loans and contain the magnitude of the domestic lending squeeze. At
the same time, however, banks and ¿rms in South East Asia that had borrowed from Japan
were hit by the currency shocks: the ¿nancial outlook of Japanese banks and securities ¿rms
correspondingly deteriorated.
Compared to the role of the US in Mexican crisis of 1994-95 (when the US, the major
regional economic power, was in a strong cyclical upswing), undoubtedly the weakness of
Japan in 1997 exacerbated poor economic fundamentals in Asia and worsened the unfolding
of the currency crises. At the same time, the Asian crisis hit the vulnerable economy of Japan
hard, imposing the conditions for a scenario of systemic deterioration of the macroeconomic
conditions in the region that, by September 1998, has not yet shown signs of recomposing.
7. Strategies to recover from the crisis: an overview of the recent debate
Before delving into the analysis ofthe most recent developments in the region, wedevote
two sections of our study to a brief assessment of the current debate on the policy strategies
to recover from the crisis.
78 This section focuses on the divergent views of the role played by
the IMF in dampening — or exacerbating — the impact of the crisis. The following section
discusses the case for limiting international capital mobility as a crisis management strategy.
The philosophy of IMF involvement in Asia has been synthesized as follows by the
Managing Director of the IMF, Michel Camdessus:
“As soon as it was called upon, the IMF moved quickly to help Thailand, then
Indonesia, and then Korea formulate reform programs aimed at tackling the roots
of their problems and restoring investor con¿dence. In view of the nature of the
crisis, these programs had to go far beyond addressing the major ¿scal, monetary,
or external balances. Their aim is to strengthen ¿nancial systems, improve
governance and transparency, restore economic competitiveness, and modernize
the legal and regulatory environment.”
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As a condition for the loans, the recipes of the IMF hinged substantially upon two key
postulates: the need to reform the economies, with particular emphasis on ¿scal discipline
and banking sector restructuring, and the requirement to maintain high interest rates to avoid
capital outÀows and currency attacks. Table 39 reports the chronology of the agreements
betweentheIMFandtheAsiancountriesbetweenJuly1997andAugust1998. Thechronology
makes it clear that the targets and the tactics of the Fund did not remain unchanged over time:
as the situation in Asia progressively deteriorated, the requests of the IMF became less and less
restrictive over time. The Indonesian case provides a striking example of such modi¿cations.
The ¿rstaid packageofOctober1997encompassedstrict¿scaldiscipline, whilethe agreement
of June 1998 allowed the country to limit the budget de¿cit — as opposed to target a budgetary
:; Needless to say, our survey is only meant to provide a synthetic introduction to the multifaceted issues
under discussion since the summer of 1997. For a wider window on the debate, the reader is referred to the
aforementioned Asian Crisis Homepage.
:< Camdessus (1998).47
surplus — below 8.5% of GDP.
80 To some observers, such evolution represents an unequivocal
sign of Àexibility and open-mindedness. To other observers, these changes occurred too late.
7.1 Did tight monetary policies and high interest rates worsen the crisis?
Several analysts have argued that the high interest rates prescribed by the IMF to limit
currency depreciation had severe repercussions on the economies of the Asian countries.
According to the critics of the IMF recipes, interest rates hikes were not effective in slowing
down currency depreciation, but rather worsened the extent of the crisis by leading to
widespread banking and corporate bankruptcies. The effects of these policies have been
described in terms of a vicious circle: the credit crunch imparted severe ¿nancial losses to
otherwise solvent companies the widespread fall in pro¿tability translated into higher levels
of non-performing loans and credit risk, exacerbating the crisis-induced recessions and, in
turn, causing a further contraction in the supply of credit.
In the light of these considerations, the appropriate policy response to the crisis should
have been one of loose money and low interest rates — the same strategy adopted by Japan
to deal with its internal crisis. According to an extreme version of this argument, during the
crisis there were conditions for a currency/interest rate ‘Laffer curve’: a fall —n o tar i s e—o f
the interest rates would have strengthened the economy and restored con¿dence, causing the
Asian currencies to appreciate.
The above criticisms, however, have been challenged on a key issue. Loose monetary
policies in the early stages of a currency crisis contribute to exacerbate the extent of the
depreciation, increasingtheburdenofforeigncurrency-denominatedliabilitiesissuedbybanks
and ¿rms. In the presence of large external net liabilities, a monetary expansion could actually
produce ¿nancial distress and bankruptcies, setting in motion the same vicious circle described
above.
81 Consistent with this argument is the view that the severity of the Asian crisis could
in part be attributed to the unwillingness of the governments to undertake the appropriate
restrictive measures at the right time: the aforementioned case of low interest rate policies
in Malaysia after the runs on the Thai baht is a ¿tting example. By the same token, Japan’s
policy response to its internal crisis could not be considered suitable for other Asian countries.
As Japan is a large net foreign creditor with sizable current account surpluses, the effects of
a weaker yen on the Japanese economy are qualitatively and quantitatively different from the
effects of low interest rates and exchange rate depreciation in countries with a large external
debt denominated in foreign currency. As regards the ‘Laffer curve’ argument, it is — in the
words of Paul Krugman — “as silly as it sounds”.
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While the appropriate interest rate policy at the onset of the crisis is still subject to
a widespread debate, at the time of this writing — and in the light of the large recessions
experienced by the Asian economies in 1998 —most observers seem to agree that high interest
rates maintained beyond an ‘emergency scenario’ can have destabilizing consequences.
Indeed, by the summer of 1998 interest rates in the East Asian region have signi¿cantly fallen
;3 The latest IMF plans also allow for a ¿scal de¿cit of 4% in Korea, and 2% in Thailand.
;4 A loose monetary policy could of course also ignite inÀationary expectations.
;5 Krugman (1998 b).48
and, in Korea and Thailand, they are now back to pre-crisis levels. Yet, these countries are
currently exhibiting a credit crunch which does not appear to be related to the level of interest
rates rather, it has more to do with the inability of ¿nancially distressed banks to lend to a
corporate sector laboring under the weight of a severe debt overhang.
7.2 Did the IMF plans require unnecessary ¿scal adjustments?
Several commentators have argued that the ¿scal policy requirements included in the
IMF plans were unnecessarily — and harmfully — strict. At the onset of the crisis, the
Asian countries under attack were running low budget de¿cits or ¿scal surpluses, and were
characterized by relatively low ratios of public debt to GDP, unlike the typical interlocutors
of the IMF in past crisis episodes. Excessively tight ¿scal discipline made the crisis-induced
recession worse.
In support of the ‘discipline’ view, it has been contended that loose ¿scal policies at the
onset of the crisis would have raised doubts about the policy-makers’ commitment to reduce
the outstanding current account imbalances, jeopardizing the credibility of their plans. Also,
as pointed out in section 3 above, while ¿scal de¿cits and debt were typically low before the
crisis, in several Asian countries the projected ¿scal costs of post-crisis ¿nancial bail-outs are
estimated to be in the range of 20 to 30% of GDP. As these extra public liabilities translate into
a permanent increase in the interest bill paid by Asian governments of 2-4% of GDP per year,
¿scal balances must be appropriately adjusted. In this respect, the IMF has reiterated that, on
a country-by-country basis, ¿scal plans were targeted to raise the necessary revenues to meet
these extra interest costs. Quoting a speech by Stanley Fischer in January 1998,
“the ¿scal programs vary from country to country. In each case, the IMF asked
for a ¿scal adjustment that would cover the carrying costs of ¿nancial sector
restructuring — the full cost of which is being spread over many years — and to
help restore a sustainable balance of payments. In Thailand, this translated into
an initial ¿scal adjustment of 3 percent of GDP in Korea, 1 1/2 percent of GDP
and in Indonesia, 1 percent of GDP, much of which will be achieved by reducing
public investment in projects with low economic returns.”
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One year after the eruption of the Thai crisis, some observers shared the view that the
IMF may have been too slow in revising its approach to ¿scal policy in the crisis countries.
It was only when the recessions rapidly materialized in the course of 1998 that the IMF
progressively loosened its ¿scal conditions to allow for cyclically-adjusted ¿scal de¿cits.
However, it should be acknowledged that over the entire year of 1998, news about the size
and depth of the recessionary effects of the crisis came as a shocking surprise not only to the
Asian governments and the IMF, but also to a vast majority of country analysts.
7.3 Did the IMF ‘stick to its knitting’?
The breadth of the restructuring efforts required by the IMF have raised a concern that
the Fund has been playing an excessively intrusive role in domestic affairs. The criticism that,
;6 Fischer (1998 a).49
by including in the programs a number of structural elements, the IMF was moving beyond
its traditional macro-adjustment related areas of competence (monetary and ¿scal tasks) was
¿rst made by Martin Feldstein.
84 Similar arguments were echoed by regional commentators,
resentful of what they perceived as an imposition of major structural reforms (in areas as
heterogeneous as ¿nancial and labor markets, competition policy, trade relations) and an
interference with the jurisdiction of a sovereign government.
The main counter-arguments were spelled out by Stanley Fischer in his reply to
Feldstein.
85 To the extent that the Asian meltdown was attributable to structural problems
rather than the traditional macroeconomic imbalances, an effective rescue strategy was bound
to address the issues at the very core of the crisis. IMF lending to the Asian region would
serve no purpose if the weaknesses of the ¿nancial sector (ranging from poor bank supervision
and regulation to murky relations among governments, banks and corporations) were not
removed by the appropriate structural reforms. Similarly, the insistence on good governance
and the avoidance of ‘crony capitalism’ represented a precondition to avoid future crises, as
halfhearted reform efforts would not help to re-establish market con¿dence. Fischer concluded
that
“the basic approach of the IMF to these crises has been appropriate — not perfect,
to be sure, but far better than if the structural elements had been ignored or the
fund had not been involved.”
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7.4 Did plans to close insolvent banks lead to runs on solvent banks?
The possibility that IMF plans to close insolvent banks led to runs on ¿nancially healthy
banks has been pointed out, among others, by Jeffrey Sachs. In his comments on the ¿rst IMF
plan for Indonesia, which called for the closing of sixteen banks, Sachs stated:
“In my view, although it’s a minority opinion, the IMF did a lot of con¿dence-
reducing measures. In particular, I blame the IMF for abruptly closing ¿nancial
institutions throughout Asia, sending a remarkably abrupt, unprepared and
dangerous signal [...] that you had better take your money out or you might lose
it. ”
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The advocates of the opposite view point out that the IMF was not at fault if measures
of prevention of bank runs — such as incentive-compatible deposit insurance schemes —
were not in place in Indonesia. Moreover, when the IMF requirement partly back¿red and
an unexpected run occurred, President Suharto’s government bore responsibility for failing to
enact promised reforms in exchange for the $40 billion international rescue effort. In support
of this view is the fact that the requirements imposed on Indonesia by the IMF, including the
closing of insolvent banks, were similar to those demanded of Thailand and Korea yet, neither
;7 Feldstein (1998).
;8 Fischer (1998 c).
;9 Ib., p.106.
;: “To stop the money panic,” interview with Jeffrey Sachs, Asiaweek, February 13 1998.50
country experienced bank runs of the same magnitude as those hitting Indonesia. It has also
been argued that, in the Indonesian case, more rather than less should have been done: as
early as September 1997, widely circulated documents listed more than 16 Indonesian banks
experiencing ¿nancial dif¿culties. Instead, the prompt reopening of a closed bank owned by
one of President Suharto’s sons contributed to reducing the con¿dence of the public on the
overall rescue plan.
7.5 Did IMF intervention enhance world-wide moral hazard?
Many authors have expressed concern with the possibility that IMF-led rescue packages
may risk a moral hazard. This is because expectations of a bail-out can lead investors and
creditors to refrain from effectively monitoring their investment and lending strategies. Also,
of¿cials in debtor countries may pursue excessively risky courses of action, leaving a country
more vulnerable to sudden shocks to fundamentals and shifts in market sentiment. While the
residents of the country hit by a crisis suffer because of the crisis-induced recession, to the
extent that the creditors are bailed-out they do not bear a fair share of the burden of the crisis.
Unquestionably, the risks of creating moral hazard will be thoroughly assessed within
the future debate on international policy design and crisis prevention in emerging markets.
Yet, several objections have been voiced against a simplistic reading of the problem. First,
there is no direct evidence that the surge in capital Àows to Asia after 1995 were related to
expectations of international bail-outs in the aftermath of the Mexican rescue package. The
second objection regards the issue of who bears the costs of the crisis. The IMF has repeatedly
pointed out that a majority of private creditors, especially bond-holders and equity investors,
took a huge hit during the crisis. By the end of 1997, foreign equity investors had nearly
lost three quarters of their equity holdings in some Asian markets. Nonetheless, commercial
banks were to some extent spared for instance, foreign banks operating in Korea demanded
public guarantees on bank loans as a precondition for rolling over the existing loans, without
forgiving any amounts due,
88 a point highlighted by Litan (1998).
The third objection goes against the argument that countries which rely on international
support when things go out of control will follow unsound policies. As put by Fischer,
“countries try to avoid going to the fund policy makers whose countries end up in trouble
generally do not survive politically. In this regard, attaching conditions to assistance gives
policy makers incentives to do the right thing.”
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A fourth, and more substantial point, is that moral hazard may be the lesser evil, as the
alternative response to a crisis — to leave countries and creditors to sort out their debts —
may have much more dramatic and distortionary consequences. The lessons from the interwar
period and the 1980s point out that such a strategy requires complex negotiations over a long
period of time, during which access to international markets is curtailed and long-term growth
drastically lowered. Also, the experience of the 1990s suggests that highly interdependent
economies can be subject to the rapid transmission and the ‘contagious’ spread of speculative
;; To be sure, some of the banks have added modestly to their loan reserves to account for possible future
write-offs, while claiming to be charging interest rates that do not fully reÀect the risk of the loans rolled over.
;< Fischer (1998 c), p.106.51
waves and ¿nancial panic across regions. In this scenario, a delay in taming a local crisis
through the appropriate program of international assistance — and the failure to promptly
restore market con¿dence — would greatly increase the chances of a systemic chain reaction
across countries.
8. The Asian crisis and the debate on capital controls
Vis-à-vis the persistent and pervasive nature of the current crisis, the terms of the current
debate have progressively encompassed such items as the reform of multilateral institutions,
t h ef u t u r eo fe c o n o m i ca n d¿ nancial cooperation and, most importantly, the desirability of
deregulation and liberalization of international capital markets. The crucial question in this
debate is whether exchange controls and limited capital mobility should become elements of
an overall strategy of international crisis management and global restructuring.
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In order to discuss this topic, one needs to distinguish among three related issues: a) the
case for controls on short-term capital inÀows b) the case for controls on capital outÀows in
t h ee v e n to fac r i s i s and c) the optimal speed and sequencing of capital account liberalization.
Regardingthe¿rstissue, ithasbeenarguedthatrestrictionsonshort-terminÀowsmaybe
part of an appropriate policy strategy to prevent a crisis, as they discourage volatile short-term
portfolio investment and therefore insulate the country from the disruptive effects of sudden
reversals in market sentiment. The experiences with capital controls on short-term inÀows of
Chile,
91 Colombia and Slovenia are often mentioned in support of this view.
Restrictions on short-term capital inÀows may take the form of cross-border controls
on bank lending and borrowing only, or be extended to all short-term Ào w s . T h ec a s ef o r
controls on short-term cross-border interbank Àows is less controversial than the alternative. It
is usually couched in terms of prudential banking standards, rather than in terms of restrictions
on capital Àows. The case for regulating interbank lending and borrowing hinges upon the
evidence on the disruptive effects of highly volatileÀows, such as the case when creditor banks
suddenly refused to renew their loans to ¿rms and banks in Korea, Thailand and Indonesia.
In principle, restrictions and controls on interbank Àows could be i m p o s e do ne i t h e r
lending banks or borrowing banks. Regarding the former possibility, it should be stressed that,
under the current Basle capital adequacy standards, lending banks have a clear incentive to
supply short-term, rather than long-term loans to banks in emerging markets. This is because
risk weights are lower on short-term than long term bank loans. After the Asian crisis, there
is a growing consensus in favor of changing these standards, so as to penalize short-term bank
lending to emerging markets through a revision of risk weights (this is currently undergoing
as part of the BIS review of the capital adequacy standards).
As regards restrictions on the borrower side, the consensus view is that effective
prudential regulation of banks in emerging economies requires higher reserve requirement
ratios on liabilities representing cross-border interbank loans and deposits. Note that, as
<3 For an overview of the debate since the Halifax Summit of 1995 see Kenen (1996).
<4 For an assessment of the Chilean experience, see Massad (1998).52
highlighted from our discussion, possible restrictions on short-term cross border banks Àows
are debated within the context of prudential regulation and supervision of¿nancial institutions.
The case for broader controls on all short-term capital inÀows (including also portfolio
investments and equities) is more controversial. The main argument in its favor is that controls
on interbank Àows may not be suf¿cient to shield a country from the high volatility of ‘hot
money’ Àows. To the extent that also corporate ¿rms respond to distorted incentives leading
them to excessive borrowing, controls on corporate foreign liabilities, especially short-term,
may be warranted. In the recent experience of Asia, for example, during the 1990s corporate
¿rms directly undertook risky cross-border borrowing on a large scale. In Indonesia corporate
borrowing was massive, over $70 billion, and much larger than foreign borrowing by banks.
The scale of corporate borrowing was very large also in the other crisis countries.
The available empirical evidence from Chile and other countries that have imposed
controls on a broad range of short-term capital inÀo w si sm i x e d .C o n t r o l sd oa p p e a rt oa f f e c t
the composition of inÀows (in favor of long-term loans and FDI) but do not appear to affect
the overall volume of inÀows. Moreover, controls become less effective over time, because
of evasion and leakages (especially via trade credits). Finally, there is some evidence that
the Chilean controls have favored large corporations over small and medium ones. It has been
argued that the apparent success of Chile in avoiding major currency crises should be attributed
to an effective prudential regulation and supervision of the ¿nancial system, more than to the
presence of controls on short-term inÀows. In this respect, it is worth emphasizing that, during
the recent ¿nancial turmoil, Chile — along with Colombia and Brazil — did actually phase-
out controls, with the goal of stimulating much needed capital inÀows, and reduce the pressure
on the currency.
T h ec a s ef o rcontrols on capital outÀows, especially in the aftermath of a currency crisis,
appearsmuchmorecontroversialintheongoingacademicandpolicydebate.
92 Thelogicofthe
argument in favor of outÀow controls is laid out by Krugman (1998 c). The economic recovery
in Asia is hampered by high interest rates, but, under perfect capital mobility, a reduction in
these rates would further depreciate the exchange rate. For countries with a high stock of
liabilities denominated in foreign currency, a depreciation would then be recessionary, via the
increasing burden of foreign debt. Controls on capital Àows allow domestic policy makers to
break the links between interest rates and exchange rates, so that interest rates can be lowered
without incurring the cost of a currency devaluation. Krugman stresses the effectiveness of
capital controls with the following provocative characterization of the successful performance
of the Chinese economy in 1997-98:
“think about China right now: a country whose crony capitalism makes Thailand
looklikeSwitzerlandandwhosebankersmakeSuharto’ssonlooklikeJ.P. Morgan.
Why hasn’t China been nearly as badly hit as its neighbors? Because it has
been able to cut, not raise, interest rates in this crisis, despite maintaining a ¿xed
<5 By the fall of 1998, a number of countries are assessing costs and bene¿ts of the recourse to capital
controls as a strategy to mitigate the extent of a crisis. At the beginning of September 1998, the Malaysian central
bank announced the introduction of capital controls, requiring of¿cial approval for repatriation and withdrawal
of ringgits from external accounts, imposing that all settlements of exports and imports be made in foreign
currency, limiting the sale and purchase of ringgit-denominated ¿nancial assets to transactions through authorized
depository institutions, and restricting the export of foreign currency by resident travellers. More drastic controls
were introduced in Russia following the August 17 decision to devalue the ruble.53
exchange rate and the reason it is able to do that is that it has an inconvertible
currency, a.k.a. exchange controls. Those controls are often evaded, and they are
the source of lots of corruption, but they still give China a degree of policy leeway
that the rest of Asia desperately wishes it had.”
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Is the short-run relief that capital controls give to policy makers offset by their long-
run costs (higher inÀation, higher risk-premium, ef¿ciency costs due to a distorted allocation
etc.)? Some authors argue that there is no compelling empirical evidence that countries
which implement capital account convertibility are systematically associated with better
macroeconomic performances in the long run. For instance, Rodrik (1998) has recently shown
that, in a large sample of countries, “the data provide no evidence that countries without
capital controls have grown faster, invested more, or experienced lower inÀation. Capital
controls are essentially uncorrelated with long-term performance once we control for other
determinants”.
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Advocates of the opposite view highlight several arguments against such controls on
capital outÀows. First, imposing capital controls and limiting capital mobility — they argue
— is no ‘solution’ to the structural problems underlying the Asian crisis. Rather, policy
interventions should aim at making the ¿nancial system sound, well regulated and effectively
supervised.
95 The second argument is based on the experience with capital controls in Latin
America in the aftermath of the 1980s debt crisis, which was quite dismal. Controls tended
to be ineffective, a tool of ¿nancial repression associated with negative real interest rates. For
these reasons, they eventually led to more, rather than less, capital Àight.
Thethirdargumentstressestheroleof‘politicalrisk’ininternational¿nancialinstability.
While the implementation of capital controls may help ¿ghting a crisis and buy time to
organize a policy response to speculative Àows, the anticipation (or the possibility) of controls
may actually accelerate the crisis. In this respect, the fact that some countries impose controls
may lead to a perverse international contagion on other countries. The news of capital controls
imposed by Russia and Malaysia in August 1998 was arguably an important factor in the
contagious spread of ¿nancial panic to Latin America and other emerging markets.
Finally, capital controls are not implemented and managed by the ideally ‘benevolent’
policy makers of the economic theory, but by governments that are potential sources of
distortions and moral hazard. This implies the possibility of a political use (or misuse) of
such controls, the risk of creating incentives to rent-seeking, and the temptation to use controls
to avoid and or delay necessary reforms.
While the arguments in favor of capital controls, especially during a crisis, are
controversial, the views on the third issue presented above, the optimal speed and sequencing
of capital account liberalization,r e À ect a widespread and explicit consensus. This consensus
<6 In a subsequent ‘open letter to Prime Minister Mahathir’, Krugman suggests four ‘guiding principles’ for
an exchange controls policy to succeed: ¿rst, the actual implementation of controls should aim to disrupt ordinary
business as little as possible second, the distortions they impose on the economy should not be overlooked third,
currency controls should not be used to defend an over-valued currency fourth, controls must serve as an aid to
reform, not an alternative.
<7 Rodrik (1998), p.61.
<8 See e.g. Dornbusch (1998 b).54
view (even expressed formally within the G-7 group and the IMF
96) stresses that, while a
progressive liberalization of the capital account may be warranted over time, policy makers
should be very careful about doing it in a gradual and orderly way. As long as ¿nancial
systems are weak, poorly regulated and subject to political distortions, a hasty rush to capital
account liberalization may be unwise and produce destabilizing effects. The bene¿ts of free
capital Àows are numerous and, provided that ¿nancial systems are strong, the arguments in
favor of free capital mobility are compelling. In the transition to a system with desirable
characteristics, however, capital account liberalization will have to be cautious, gradual
and carefully managed. The transition process will have to prevent large foreign debt
accumulation, excessive borrowing and lending, and a mismatch in the maturities and currency
denomination of assets and liabilities of ¿nancial institutions and corporate ¿rms, which have
proven to be so destabilizing in many recent and less recent episodes of ¿nancial and currency
crises.
9. East Asia in 1998
9.1 Is East Asia following Mexico’s footsteps?
The currency and ¿nancial crisis has caused a sharp and severe recession in the East
Asian region in 1998. According to the IMF forecasts included in the World Economic
Outlook of October 1998, the newly industrialized Asian economies (Hong Kong, Taiwan,
Singapore, and Korea) are predicted to contract by 2.9% the economies of the ASEAN-4
nations (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand)are expected to shrink by astaggering
10.4%.
The key question is how long and deep the recession in East Asia will be. In this respect,
it has been observed that a contraction in economic activity was also experienced by Mexico
after the collapse on the peso in 1994 however, in this country the crisis-induced recession
was V-shaped: output fell sharply for about 9 months, but the contraction was followed by a
r a p i dr e c o v e r yi nt h ef a l lo f1 9 9 5a n dar e t u r nt oh i g hg r o w t hi n1 9 9 6 .T h e r ea r em a n yr e a s o n s
to believe that the East Asian cycle will not take the V-shaped form of Mexico, and that the
contraction in economic activity in the region will last for much longer.
First, in the eve of the Mexican crisis, the US was in a sharp cyclical upswing, an
upswing that has continued uninterrupted until the present high growth rates in the US. has
provided a large demand basin for Mexican goods. On the contrary, the main economy in the
Asian region has been experiencing a severe and continued recession, that aggravated in the
summer of 1997. As Japan is a signi¿cant market for the crisis countries, the severe economic
slump in Japan has exacerbated the economic conditions throughout the Asian region.
Second, in 1994 the contagion or ‘Tequila effect’ from the depreciation of the peso
was, to a large extent, contained. While the Mexican peso collapsed, the other currencies
in Latin America were able to sustain their pegs. Conversely, the Thai devaluation led to
subsequent waves of ‘contagious’ and ‘competitive’ devaluations throughout the region. These
devaluations limited the ability of the region’s economies to support their reciprocal exports
<9 See e.g. Camdessus (1998).55
indeed, trade within the region has sharply contracted, as almost all currencies were devalued
while all economies started to contract.
Third, the ¿nancial crisis triggered by the Mexican devaluation in 1994 was mainly felt
in Latin America. Conversely, over time, the Asian crisis has directly and/or indirectly grown
into global ¿nancial turmoil and contagion. In the course of 1998, commodities prices have
beenfallingsharplyandexpectationsofworldwideoutputgrowthhavebeenreviseddownward
(see next section).
For these reasons, the economic contraction in East Asia has been more severe than
the recession in Mexico in 1995 and it is likely to last longer. Several indicators tend to
con¿rmthisprediction. Forinstance, industrialproductionstartedtorecoverinMexicoabout9
months after the crisis. In comparison to Mexico, in the four crisis countries (Korea, Indonesia,
Thailand and Malaysia) industrial production has fallen more sharply, and by the end of the
summer of 1998 there has been no sign of a turnaround. By the same token, the Mexican
unemployment rate peaked 12 months after the crisis, and then fell sharply in the Asian
countries, instead, unemployment rates are still growing 14 months after the eruption of the
crisis.
Relative to Mexico, the devaluation of nominal exchange rates has been larger in
Indonesia but more modest in Korea, Thailand and Malaysia (where currencies recovered
in the ¿rst months of 1998 after falling sharply until December 1997). Partially matching
the different magnitude of nominal exchange rate deprecation, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand
experienced a sharper increase in inÀation rates and nominal interest rates than Mexico.
InÀation peaked above50%inMexicoaboutayearafterthecrisis, whileithasremainedbelow
10% in the three Asian countries however, inÀation has been out of control in Indonesia. Real
interest rates have remained high in all the crisis countries, but with a modest reduction in the
summer of 1998.
As for the post- c r i s i sM e x i c o ,t h et r a d eb a l a n c e so ft h ec r i s i sc o u n t r i e sh a v es h a r p l y
improved after the crisis. Yet, the dollar value of Mexican exports rose sharply right after the
collapse of the peso, and after year it exceeded the pre-crisis level by 20%. Conversely, in East
Asia the dollar value of exports in the crisis countries has fallen between 5% and 15% relative
to the pre-crisis level. Thus, the improvement in the trade balance is mainly due to a fall in
imports.
While the volume of Asian exports has increased (as the deterioration of their value is
in large part due to the sharp fall in prices), it has grown at a strikingly low rate relative to the
Mexican case. Demand considerations are certainly an important factor in explaining these
differences: the recession in Japan and the entire East Asian region has led to a fall in the
demand for exports from the crisis countries. However, supply side effects are also playing a
role. In particular, a severe credit crunch has limited the ability of ¿rms to produce and export.
9.2 World ¿nancial turmoil and global slowdown
During 1998, forecasts of the economic slowdown in the crisis countries have been
steadily revised downward. The economic recession in East Asia is spreading from the crisis
countries(Korea, Indonesia, ThailandandMalaysia)toHongKong, Singapore, thePhilippines
and Taiwan. The Indian subcontinent is fragile, Pakistan is having serious external balance56
and debt problems, and India is facing economic dif¿culties. More crucially, the economic
conditions in Japan, the prominent economy in the region, have deteriorated, and this country
is in need of dif¿cult banking and structural reforms, let alone an effective macroeconomic
policy to recover from the long period of stagnation.
97 Policy failures leading to a further
weakening of the yen could undermine the stability of the currencies of China and Hong Kong,
triggering a further round of stagÀationary competitive devaluations in the entire Asian region.
Economic fundamentals are still strong in the US but the global turmoil may lead to
a growth slowdown the stock market is already reÀecting such a possibility. There is clear
evidence of a worldwide growth slowdown. The IMF’s latest growth forecast for world output,
2.0% (in the October 1998 World Economic Outlook), represents a precipitous drop from the
4.3% growth anticipated one year before in October 1997. Expected growth in the Western
Hemisphere is now 2.3%, down from 5.1%. More severely, the estimated 2.0% world growth
is comparable to that observed during previous world recessions, such as 1974-75, 1980-83,
and 1990-91. Apart from the South-East Asia countries — whose growth forecasts were
documented in the previous section — Japan’s economy is expected to decline by 2.5%, while
Russia is expected to contract by 6% in 1998.
Moreover, commodities prices, which were rising in 1995, have fallen sharply in 1997-
1998 per effect of the global economic slowdown. This fall is hurting all commodity exporters.
In Latin America, falling oil prices have hit Mexico and Venezuela, falling copper prices are
hurting Chile and Peru, while falling agricultural prices are affecting Argentina. Advanced
industrial countries have not been spared either. Commodity prices played a crucial role in the
depreciations of the currencies of Canada, Australia and New Zealand given their tight trade
links with East Asia, the latter two are already headed towards a recession.
In the summer of 1998, what started as a regional economic and ¿nancial crisis in East
Asia developed into a global ¿nancial turmoil with severe real consequences. The serious
economic and political crisis in Russia, along with the fall of the ruble, generated speculative
pressures in the region, affecting the currency and ¿nancial markets of Eastern and Central
European countries. A spread of the crisis to the transition economies in Europe would affect
Western Europe, where the current economic recovery is solid but not very rapid. Currency
speculation has already hit the Northern European countries which are not members of the
EMU.
The crisis in Russia has affected the currencies and stock markets of Latin America,
increasing the risk of a continental crisis. The currencies in Colombia, Venezuela and
Brazil have been under pressure, while stock markets throughout the region are signi¿cantly
down. While Latin American economies are structurally stronger than Russia, investors are
increasingly averse to risk. In August 1998, emerging market spreads over Treasuries (about
1500 basis points) were close to the peaks reached during the 1995 Mexican peso crisis.
<: In this respect, James Tobin writes: “Considering the damage Japan’s disastrous macroeconomic perfor-
mance has done to the Asian and world economies along with the apparent inability of the Japanese to enjoy
spending money on themselves, perhaps the Japanese government should unilaterally transfer bundles of yen to
other Asian countries and poor countries everywhere for development projects and relief of poverty, requiring
that these yen be spent in Japan” (The Straits Times, July 18, 1998).57
10.Open issues
In the light of the most recent developments in the region, we ¿nd it appropriate to
conclude our study by brieÀy highlighting some open issues regarding the implications of the
crisis.
Some of the crisis countries, notably Indonesia, Korea and Thailand, are currently
experiencing a harsh economic contraction. Many corporations have little access to working
capital and are burdened by a massive stock of liabilities. Corporate debt-to-equity ratios that
were already high before the crisis have grown higher, up to levels that can hardly be deemed
sustainable (400% in Thailand, over 500% in Korea, an even higher ratio for Indonesia).
Banks are under extreme stress. Partly as the result of high interest rates (which increase
the rate of non-performing loans), and partly due to the attempt to recapitalize ¿nancial
intermediaries at a rapid pace, the net worth of the banking system of Korea, Thailand
and Indonesia has drastically deteriorated. It should be emphasized that, in terms of actual
disbursement, of¿cial ¿nancial assistance has been signi¿cantly lower than announced and
reported by newspaper headlines. Financial means from of¿cial sources have not alleviated
the liquidity squeeze in capital markets.
In such context of ¿nancial distress and debt overhang, banks have been severely cutting
credit to ¿rms. In some cases, this has been a decisive factor in inducing bankruptcy of
corporations that in all likelihood would have been solvent in normal conditions. Contractions
in trade credit are particularly painful, as such cuts undermine the ¿rms’ ability to import
intermediate inputs, and to produce and export domestic goods. An important indicator
supporting this statement is the fact that, in spite of massive real depreciations, the exports
from the crisis countries have not signi¿cantly increased in volume.
Over the summer of 1998, interest rates in Asia have signi¿cantly fallen relative to the
peaks of the crisis, and in Korea they are back to pre-crisis levels. In spite of this, the credit
crunch is still severe in most countries: while the price of credit has been falling, banks that
are effectively bankrupt or experience¿nancial distress are unwilling to lend to corporate¿rms
suffering from debt overhang, so that loans are still drastically rationed. In such a situation,
capital controls leading to lower interest rates would do little to ease the credit crunch, and it
is far from clear whether they would help to remove structural impediments to recovery.
While the need for a more decisive expansionary policy has been widely recognized,
several observers have emphasized that an effective way to help the Asian countries to start
producing and exporting again may consist of an accelerated debt restructuring process that
will recapitalize banks, reduce corporate debt overhang, and provide ¿rms with debt moratoria
and new priority ¿nancing of working capital and trade. In this regard, it can be argued that a
gradual, voluntary and market-based work-out of foreign and domestic debts is not the most
effective strategy to address this issue, since a market-based process of debt restructuring
may be too slow. The longer the process takes, the larger the number of otherwise solvent
¿rms that become insolvent, and the worse the collapse of economic activity. Suggestions
for a comprehensive approach to bank and corporate restructuring with a more active role of
governments may have to be considered.58
Tables 
§
                                                                         
§ The source of all data in these Tables is the International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund (unless otherwise
noted). The data for Taiwan are from various sources (Economist Intelligence Unit Reports, IMF’s  December 1997 World Economic
Outlook and Asian Development Bank). The data for Singapore for 1997 are from the Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report, 2nd
quarter 1998.
7DEOH&XUUHQW$FFRXQW1,$'HILQLWLRQ(% of GDP)
       
.RUHD -1.24 -3.16 -1.70 -0.16 -1.45 -1.91 -4.82 -1.90
,QGRQHVLD -4.40 -4.40 -2.46 -0.82 -1.54 -4.27 -3.30 -3.62
0DOD\VLD -2.27 -14.01 -3.39 -10.11 -6.60 -8.85 -3.73 -3.50
3KLOLSSLQHV -6.30 -2.46 -3.17 -6.69 -3.74 -5.06 -4.67 -6.07
6LQJDSRUH 9.45 12.36 12.38 8.48 18.12 17.93 16.26 13.90
7KDLODQG -8.74 -8.01 -6.23 -5.68 -6.38 -8.35 -8.51 -2.35
+RQJ.RQJ 8.40 6.58 5.26 8.14 1.98 -2.97 -2.43 -3.75
&KLQD 3.02 3.07 1.09 -2.19 1.16 0.03 0.52 3.61
7DLZDQ 7.42 6.97 4.03 3.52 3.12 3.05 4.67 3.23
7DEOH&XUUHQW$FFRXQW%23'HILQLWLRQ(% of GDP)
       
.RUHD -0.69 -2.83 -1.28 0.30 -1.02 -1.86 -4.75 -1.85
,QGRQHVLD -2.82 -3.65 -2.17 -1.33 -1.58 -3.18 -3.37 -2.24
0DOD\VLD -2.03 -8.69 -3.74 -4.66 -6.24 -8.43 -4.89 -4.85
3KLOLSSLQHV -6.08 -2.28 -1.89 -5.55 -4.60 -2.67 -4.77 -5.23
6LQJDSRUH 8.33 11.29 11.38 7.57 16.12 16.81 15.65 15.37
7KDLODQG -8.50 -7.71 -5.66 -5.08 -5.60 -8.06 -8.10 -1.90
&KLQD 3.09 3.27 1.33 -1.94 1.26 0.23 0.87 3.24
7DLZDQ 6.82 6.94 4.03 3.16 2.70 2.10 4.05 2.72
7DEOH7UDGH%DODQFH%23'HILQLWLRQ(% of GDP)
       
.RUHD -0.81 -3.04 -1.42 0.06 -1.22 -1.63 -4.36 -1.44
,QGRQHVLD 1.68 0.91 1.81 1.48 0.72 -0.76 -1.14 0.22
0DOD\VLD 2.10 -3.74 1.39 -0.11 -1.59 -3.75 0.58
3KLOLSSLQHV -5.73 -3.00 -4.27 -8.53 -8.95 -8.80 -9.44 -12.30
6LQJDSRUH 6.76 10.62 9.29 8.12 14.87 15.38 13.62 12.55
7KDLODQG -7.75 -6.88 -4.70 -4.56 -5.18 -7.09 -6.65 0.14
&KLQD 2.75 2.86 1.03 -1.92 1.39 1.68 2.10 4.41
7DLZDQ 4.74 4.39 1.69 1.60 1.66 1.61 3.45 2.35
7DEOH*'3*URZWK
      
.RUHD 9.13 5.06 5.75 8.58 8.94 7.10 5.47
,QGRQHVLD 6.95 6.46 6.50 15.93 8.22 7.98 4.65
0DOD\VLD 8.48 7.80 8.35 9.24 9.46 8.58 7.81
3KLOLSSLQHV -0.58 0.34 2.12 4.38 4.77 5.76 9.66
6LQJDSRUH 7.27 6.29 10.44 10.05 8.75 7.32 7.55
7KDLODQG 8.18 8.08 8.38 8.94 8.84 5.52 -0.43
+RQJ.RQJ 4.97 6.21 6.15 5.51 3.85 5.03 5.29
&KLQD 9.19 14.24 12.09 12.66 10.55 9.54 8.80
7DLZDQ 7.55 6.76 6.32 6.54 6.03 5.67 6.8159
Source: JP Morgan and authors calculations.
7DEOH)LQDQFLDO&RQGLWLRQVRI7RS.RUHDQ&KDHERODWWKHHQGRI(in hundred million won and %).
&KDHERO 7RWDO$VVHWV 'HEW 6DOHV 1HW3URILW 'HEW(TXLW\5DWLR
6DPVXQJ 508.6 370.4 601.1 1.8 268.2
+\XQGDL 531.8 433.2 680.1 1.8 439.1
'DHZRR 342.1 263.8 382.5 3.6 337.3
/* 370.7 287.7 466.7 3.6 346.5
+DQMLQ 139.0 117.9 87.0 -1.9 556.9
.LD 141.6 118.9 121.0 -1.3 523.6
6VDQJ\RQJ 158.1 127.0 194.5 -1.0 409.0
6XQN\RQJ 227.3 180.4 266.1 2.9 385.0
+DQKZD 109.7 97.2 96.9 -1.8 778.2
'DHOLP 57.9 45.9 48.3 0.1 380.1
.XPKR 74.0 61.2 44.4 -0.2 477.9
'RRVDQ 64.0 55.9 40.5 -1.1 692.3
+DOOD 66.3 63.2 52.9 0.2 2067.6
6DPPL 25.2 25.9 14.9 -2.5 3245.0
+\RVXQJ 41.2 32.5 54.8 0.4 373.2
+DQLO 26.3 22.3 13.0 -1.2 563.2
'RQJD&RQVWUXFWLRQ 62.9 49.1 38.9 0.4 355.0
.RKDS 36.5 31.2 25.2 0.3 589.5
-LQUR 39.4 39.0 14.8 -1.6 8598.7
'RQJJXN-DHNDQN 37.0 25.4 30.7 0.9 210.4
/RWWH 77.5 51.0 71.9 0.5 191.2
.RORQ 38.0 28.9 41.3 0.2 316.5
+DLWDL 34.0 29.5 27.2 0.4 658.3
6LQKR-DHML 21.3 17.7 12.2 -0.1 489.5
$QDP,QGXVWULDO 26.4 21.8 19.8 0.1 478.1
'RQJJXN0X\RN 16.2 13.6 10.7 -0.2 587.9
1HZ&RUH 28.0 25.9 18.3 0.2 1224.0
%RQJLO 20.3 18.3 8.7 -0.9 920.5
+DQVRO 47.9 37.1 25.5 -0.1 343.2
+DQVLQ.RQJ\RQJ 13.3 11.5 10.6 0.0 648.8
Source: Chosun Ilbo, November 29, 1997.
7DEOH,QYHVWPHQW5DWHV(% of GDP)
       
.RUHD 36.93 38.90 36.58 35.08 36.05 37.05 38.42 34.97
,QGRQHVLD 36.15 35.50 35.87 29.48 31.06 31.93 30.80 31.60
0DOD\VLD 31.34 37.25 33.45 37.81 40.42 43.50 41.54 42.84
3KLOLSSLQHV 24.16 20.22 21.34 23.98 24.06 22.22 24.02 24.84
6LQJDSRUH 35.87 34.21 35.97 37.69 32.69 33.12 35.07 37.40
7KDLODQG 41.08 42.84 39.97 39.94 40.27 41.61 41.73 34.99
+RQJ.RQJ 27.44 27.20 28.50 27.54 31.85 34.91 32.38 35.08
&KLQD 34.74 34.77 36.17 43.47 40.88 40.20 38.73 37.55
7DLZDQ 23.08 23.29 24.90 25.16 23.87 23.65 21.24 22.20
7DEOH,QFUHPHQWDO&DSLWDO2XWSXW5DWLR,&25
   
.RUHD 3.8 4.9 7KDLODQG 3.4 5.1
,QGRQHVLD 4.0 3.8 +RQJ.RQJ 3.7 6.1
0DOD\VLD 3.7 4.8 &KLQD 3.1 2.9
3KLOLSSLQHV 6.0 5.5 7DLZDQ 2.4 3.9
6LQJDSRUH 3.6 4.060
Source: LG Economic Research Institute
Source: JP Morgan "Asian Financial Markets", January 1998. 1997 figures for












-DNDUWD 10.0% 20.0% 7.20%
.XDOD/XPSXU 3.0% 20.0% 5.80%
0DQLOD 1.0% 3.0% 9.30%
6LQJDSRUH 8.0% 12.0% 3.90%
%DQJNRN 15.0% 20.0% 6.80%
+RQJ.RQJ 6.0% 10.0% 3.50%
6KDQJKDL 30.0% 40.0% 8.00%
7DLSHL 4.80%
7DEOH6WRFNPDUNHWSULFHVLQGH[HV
       
.RUHD 696.00 610.00 678.00 866.00 1027.00 882.00 651.00 376.00
,QGRQHVLD 417.00 247.00 274.00 588.00 469.00 513.00 637.00 401.00
0DOD\VLD 505.00 556.00 643.00 1275.00 971.00 995.00 1237.00 594.00
3KLOLSSLQHV 651.00 1151.00 1256.00 3196.00 2785.00 2594.00 3170.00 1869.00
6LQJDSRUH 1154.00 1490.00 1524.00 2425.00 2239.00 2266.00 2216.00 1529.00
7KDLODQG 612.00 711.00 893.00 1682.00 1360.00 1280.00 831.00 372.00
+RQJ.RQJ 3024.00 4297.00 5512.00 11888.00 8191.00 10073.00 13451.00 10722.00
7DLZDQ 4350.00 4600.00 3377.00 6070.00 7111.00 5158.00 6933.00 8187.00
7DEOH6WRFNPDUNHWSULFHVLQGH[HVSURSHUW\VHFWRU
       
,QGRQHVLD 119.00 66.00 214.00 140.00 112.00 143.00 40.00
0DOD\VLD 113.00 113.00 126.00 369.00 240.00 199.00 294.00 64.00
3KLOLSSLQHV 32.00 34.00 39.00 81.00 80.00 87.00 119.00 59.00
6LQJDSRUH 230.00 280.00 250.00 541.00 548.00 614.00 648.00 357.00
7KDLODQG 74.00 82.00 168.00 367.00 232.00 192.00 99.00 7.00
+RQJ.RQJ 312.00 453.00 554.00 1392.00 862.00 1070.00 1682.00 941.00
7DLZDQ 61.00 71.00 57.00 137.00 109.00 59.00 55.00 55.0061
7DEOH6DYLQJ5DWHV(% of GDP)
       
.RUHD 35.69 35.74 34.88 34.91 34.60 35.14 33.60 33.06
,QGRQHVLD 31.75 31.10 33.41 28.66 29.52 27.65 27.50 27.98
0DOD\VLD 29.07 23.24 30.06 27.70 33.81 34.65 37.81 39.34
3KLOLSSLQHV 17.85 17.76 18.16 17.29 20.32 17.16 19.35 18.77
6LQJDSRUH 45.32 46.56 48.35 46.17 50.82 51.05 51.33 51.30
7KDLODQG 32.33 34.83 33.73 34.26 33.89 33.25 33.22 32.64
+RQJ.RQJ 35.85 33.78 33.76 35.67 33.83 31.94 29.95 31.33
&KLQD 37.77 37.84 37.26 41.29 42.04 40.22 39.25 41.15
7DLZDQ 30.50 30.26 28.93 28.68 26.99 26.70 25.92 25.43
7DEOH*RYHUQPHQW)LVFDO%DODQFHV(% of GDP)
       
.RUHD -0.68 -1.63 -0.50 0.64 0.32 0.30 0.46 0.25
,QGRQHVLD 0.43 0.45 -0.44 0.64 1.03 2.44 1.26 0.00
0DOD\VLD -3.10 -2.10 -0.89 0.23 2.44 0.89 0.76 2.52
3KLOLSSLQHV -3.47 -2.10 -1.16 -1.46 1.04 0.57 0.28 0.06
6LQJDSRUH 10.53 8.58 12.35 15.67 11.93 13.07 14.10 9.52
7KDLODQG 4.59 4.79 2.90 2.13 1.89 2.94 0.97 -0.32
&KLQD -0.79 -1.09 -0.97 -0.85 -1.22 -1.00 -0.82 -0.75
7DLZDQ 1.85 -2.18 -5.34 -3.88 -1.73 -1.09 -1.34 -1.68
7DEOH,QIODWLRQ5DWH
      
.RUHD 9.30 6.22 4.82 6.24 4.41 4.96 4.45
,QGRQHVLD 9.40 7.59 9.60 12.56 8.95 6.64 11.62
0DOD\VLD 4.40 4.69 3.57 3.71 5.28 3.56 2.66
3KLOLSSLQHV 18.70 8.93 7.58 9.06 8.11 8.41 5.01
6LQJDSRUH 3.40 2.32 2.27 3.05 1.79 1.32 2.00
7KDLODQG 5.70 4.07 3.36 5.19 5.69 5.85 5.61
+RQJ.RQJ 11.60 9.32 8.52 8.16 8.59 6.30 5.83
&KLQD 3.50 6.30 14.60 24.20 16.90 8.30 2.80
7DLZDQ 3.63 4.50 2.87 4.09 3.75 3.01 0.90
7DEOH2SHQQHVV([SRUWV,PSRUWVDVDRI*'3
       
.RUHD 30.04 29.38 29.38 29.04 30.47 33.59 34.36 38.48
,QGRQHVLD 26.30 27.18 28.23 25.26 25.94 26.98 26.13 28.22
0DOD\VLD 75.23 86.52 76.64 87.72 92.15 97.42 91.50 93.55
3KLOLSSLQHV 30.40 31.09 31.58 35.58 36.98 40.26 44.90 54.20
7KDLODQG 37.76 39.24 38.98 39.69 40.99 44.88 42.19 46.69
+RQJ.RQJ 129.93 135.28 140.37 137.18 138.92 151.67 142.28 132.68
7DLZDQ 44.27 45.14 42.34 43.29 43.16 47.80 46.63 48.0762
Data Source: J.P. Morgan. The base figure (100) is the average for the year 1990.
7DEOH1RPLQDO([FKDQJH5DWHWRWKH86'ROODUPeriod average.
        I
.RUHD 707.76 733.35 780.65 802.67 803.45 771.27 804.45 951.29 1695.00
,QGRQHVLD 1842.80 1950.30 2029.90 2087.10 2160.80 2248.60 2342.30 2909.40 4650.00
0DOD\VLD 2.70 2.75 2.55 2.57 2.62 2.50 2.52 2.81 3.89
3KLOLSSLQHV 24.31 27.48 25.51 27.12 26.42 25.71 26.22 29.47 39.98
6LQJDSRUH 1.81 1.73 1.63 1.62 1.53 1.42 1.41 1.48 1.68
7KDLODQG 25.59 25.52 25.40 25.32 25.15 24.91 25.34 31.36 47.25
+RQJ.RQJ 7.79 7.77 7.74 7.74 7.73 7.74 7.73 7.74 7.75
&KLQD 4.78 5.32 5.51 5.76 8.62 8.35 8.31 8.29 8.28
7DLZDQ 26.89 26.82 25.16 26.39 26.46 26.49 27.46 28.70 32.64
7DEOH5HDO([FKDQJH5DWHEnd of year data.
       
.RUHD 96.00 91.50 87.70 85.20 84.70 87.70 87.20 58.60
,QGRQHVLD 97.40 99.60 100.80 103.80 101.00 100.50 105.40 62.40
0DOD\VLD 97.00 96.90 109.70 111.00 107.10 106.90 112.10 84.90
3KLOLSSLQHV 92.40 103.10 107.10 97.40 111.70 109.60 116.40 90.90
6LQJDSRUH 101.20 105.70 106.00 108.60 111.90 112.70 118.20 114.40
7KDLODQG 102.20 99.00 99.70 101.90 98.30 101.70 107.60 72.40
+RQJ.RQJ 99.70 103.90 108.50 116.00 114.50 116.00 125.80 138.40
7DLZDQ 96.50 95.70 95.70 91.40 92.60 90.40 89.60 89.20
7DEOH%DQN/HQGLQJWR3ULYDWH6HFWRU(% growth)
      
.RUHD 20.78 12.55 12.94 20.08 15.45 20.01 21.95
,QGRQHVLD 17.82 12.29 25.48 22.97 22.57 21.45 46.42
0DOD\VLD 20.58 10.79 10.80 16.04 30.65 25.77 26.96
3KLOLSSLQHV 7.33 24.66 40.74 26.52 45.39 48.72 28.79
6LQJDSRUH 12.41 9.77 15.15 15.25 20.26 15.82 12.68
7KDLODQG 20.45 20.52 24.03 30.26 23.76 14.63 19.80
+RQJ.RQJ 10.17 20.15 19.94 10.99 15.75 20.10
&KLQD 19.76 20.84 43.52 24.58 24.23 24.68 20.96
7DLZDQ 21.25 28.70 19.46 16.18 10.00 6.00 8.92
7DEOH%DQN/HQGLQJWR3ULYDWH6HFWRU(% of GDP)
       
.RUHD 52.54 52.81 53.34 54.21 56.84 57.04 61.81 69.79
,QGRQHVLD 49.67 50.32 49.45 48.90 51.88 53.48 55.42 69.23
0DOD\VLD 71.36 75.29 74.72 74.06 74.61 84.80 93.39 106.91
3KLOLSSLQHV 19.17 17.76 20.44 26.37 29.06 37.52 48.98 56.53
6LQJDSRUH 82.20 83.34 85.06 84.14 84.21 90.75 95.96 100.29
7KDLODQG 64.30 67.70 72.24 80.01 91.00 97.62 101.94 116.33
+RQJ.RQJ 141.84 134.20 140.02 149.00 155.24 162.36 174.24
&KLQD 85.51 87.87 86.17 95.49 87.12 85.83 91.65 101.07
7DLZDQ 100.41 108.99 126.43 137.23 146.89 149.49 146.05 146.2363
Source: 1997 BIS Annual Report; Jardine Fleming.
Source: JP Morgan "Asian Financial Markets", January 1998.
Note: The source for Tables 23-27 is the Global Development Finance (GDF) report of the World Bank
and IMF-IFS. The data for Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan in tables 23-24 and 26-27 are from the
Asian Development Bank. The data for Korea in 1995 and 1996 (in italics) are from OECD, External
Debt Statistics.
7DEOH/HQGLQJ%RRP0HDVXUH(rate of growth between 1990 and 1996 of the ratio between
the claims on   the private sector of the deposit money banks and nominal GDP).
.RUHD 11% 6LQJDSRUH 17%
,QGRQHVLD 10% 7KDLODQG 58%
0DOD\VLD 31% +RQJ.RQJ 26%
3KLOLSSLQHV 151% &KLQD 7%
7DEOH1RQ3HUIRUPLQJ/RDQV(as proportion of otal lending in 1996)
.RUHD 8% 7KDLODQG 13%
,QGRQHVLD 13% +RQJ.RQJ 3%
0DOD\VLD 10% &KLQD 14%
3KLOLSSLQHV 14% 7DLZDQ 4%
6LQJDSRUH 4%
7DEOH%DQNLQJ6\VWHP([SRVXUHWR5LVN(% of assets at the end of 1997)
3URSHUW\ &ROODWHUDO 1RQ3HUIRUPLQJ/RDQV &DSLWDO
([SRVXUH 9DOXDWLRQ  I 5DWLR
.RUHD 15-25% 80-100% 16% 22.50% 6-10%
,QGRQHVLD 25-30% 80-100% 11% 20.00% 8-10%
0DOD\VLD 30-40% 80-100% 7.50% 15.00% 8-14%
3KLOLSSLQHV 15-20% 70 - 80% 5.50% 7.00% 15-18%
6LQJDSRUH 30-40% 70 - 80% 2.00% 3.50% 18-22%
7KDLODQG 30-40% 80-100% 15% 25% 6-10%
+RQJ.RQJ 40-55% 50 - 70% 1.50% 3% 15-20%
7DEOH)RUHLJQ'HEW:RUOG%DQN'DWDas a % of GDP
      
.RUHD 13.79 13.51 14.34 14.18 14.32  
,QGRQHVLD 65.89 68.21 68.74 56.44 60.96 61.54 56.74
0DOD\VLD 35.80 35.48 34.51 40.74 40.40 39.31 40.06
3KLOLSSLQHV 69.02 71.45 62.29 66.09 62.42 53.21 49.75
6LQJDSRUH 11.23 11.07 9.47 9.45 10.79 9.84 10.74
7KDLODQG 32.80 38.38 37.51 34.10 33.31 33.78 50.05
+RQJ.RQJ 16.80 14.84 14.99 14.35 18.38 16.60 15.44
&KLQD 14.26 14.84 14.99 14.35 18.38 16.60 15.44
7DLZDQ 11.04 10.73 9.37 10.44 10.87 10.40 10.0764
7DEOH6KRUW7HUP'HEW:RUOG%DQN'DWD(% of Total).
      
.RUHD 30.87 28.19 26.99 25.85 25.47  
,QGRQHVLD 15.92 18.00 20.52 20.17 18.05 20.87 24.98
0DOD\VLD 12.43 12.14 18.18 26.58 21.13 21.19 27.83
3KLOLSSLQHV 14.48 15.24 15.93 14.01 14.29 13.38 19.34
6LQJDSRUH 17.51 18.92 19.91 17.87 13.28 14.56 19.81
7KDLODQG 29.63 33.13 35.22 53.01 60.67 72.36 41.41
+RQJ.RQJ 45.97 46.63 45.89 41.19 30.04 28.36 43.57
&KLQD 16.85 17.89 19.01 17.80 17.40 18.91 19.72
88.31 86.49 86.93 84.99 76.75 72.18 68.44
7DEOH'HEW6HUYLFHDVD5DWLRRI([SRUWV:RUOG%DQN'DWD
      
.RUHD 10.80 7.20 7.80 9.40 6.90  
,QGRQHVLD 33.40 34.30 32.60 33.60 30.70 30.90 36.80
0DOD\VLD 12.60 7.40 9.10 8.40 9.00 7.00 8.20
3KLOLSSLQHV 27.00 23.00 24.40 25.60 18.90 16.40 13.70
7KDLODQG 16.90 13.00 13.80 13.70 13.50 11.60 11.50
+RQJ.RQJ 1.71 1.23 1.08 0.93 1.49 0.71
&KLQD 11.70 11.90 10.20 11.10 8.90 9.90 8.70
7DLZDQ 2.29 2.01 1.86 1.33 1.68 1.82
7DEOH6KRUW7HUP'HEW:RUOG%DQN'DWD(% of foreign reserves)
      
.RUHD 72.13 81.75 69.62 60.31 54.06  
,QGRQHVLD 149.28 154.62 172.81 159.70 160.36 189.42 176.59
0DOD\VLD 19.54 19.05 21.12 25.51 24.34 30.60 40.98
3KLOLSSLQHV 479.11 152.31 119.37 107.68 95.00 82.85 79.45
6LQJDSRUH 2.65 2.67 2.35 2.04 1.75 1.78 2.60
7KDLODQG 62.55 71.31 72.34 92.49 99.48 114.21 99.69
+RQJ.RQJ 23.52 21.78 18.38 17.09 16.49 14.16 22.35
&KLQD 31.49 24.68 66.76 68.33 33.04 29.62 23.74
7DLZDQ 21.56 20.21 21.00 23.64 21.76 21.64 21.31
7DEOH'HEW6HUYLFHSOXV6KRUW7HUP'HEW:RUOG%DQN'DWD(% of foreign reserves ).
      
.RUHD 127.43 125.90 110.35 105.66 84.90  
,QGRQHVLD 282.92 278.75 292.03 284.79 277.95 309.18 294.17
0DOD\VLD 63.96 45.87 45.55 42.37 48.73 55.92 69.33
3KLOLSSLQHV 867.64 256.99 217.08 212.60 171.98 166.60 137.06
7KDLODQG 102.35 99.34 101.34 120.28 126.54 138.13 122.62
+RQJ.RQJ 30.51 26.87 22.82 20.64 22.02 16.82
&KLQD 55.34 43.70 108.55 113.74 54.08 49.61 38.46
7DLZDQ 23.92 22.29 23.08 25.21 23.69 24.2065
7DEOH)RUHLJQ/LDELOLWLHVDQG$VVHWVWRZDUG%,65HSRUWLQJ%DQNV(US $ billion)
.RUHD      4 4 4
Foreign Liabilities 45.22 60.97 83.26 109.15 103.78 113.42 118.25 104.71
Foreign Assets 15.20 20.54 25.10 29.07 41.28 33.04 35.87 41.79
Net Liabilities 30.02 40.43 58.16 80.08 62.50 80.39 82.38 62.92
Foreign Liabilities (non-banks) 10.59 13.49 17.91 24.07 25.18 25.98 26.53 25.40
Foreign Assets  (non-banks) 1.45 2.29 3.58 3.47 2.24 3.42 3.06 2.28
Net Liabilities 9.14 11.20 14.33 20.61 22.94 22.57 23.46 23.13
Foreign Liabilities (banks) 34.63 47.49 65.35 85.08 78.60 87.44 91.72 79.31
Foreign Assets  (banks) 13.75 18.25 21.52 25.61 39.04 29.62 32.80 39.52
Net Liabilities 20.88 29.24 43.83 59.47 39.56 57.82 58.92 39.79
,QGRQHVLD      4 4 4
Foreign Liabilities 37.20 41.62 48.93 57.85 62.76 59.65 62.44 63.58
Foreign Assets 12.58 10.39 11.48 13.64 11.55 12.75 11.20 11.92
Net Liabilities 24.63 31.23 37.45 44.21 51.21 46.91 51.24 51.66
Foreign Liabilities (non-banks) 22.23 24.57 27.93 34.36 38.70 36.17 37.62 39.35
Foreign Assets  (non-banks) 3.61 2.47 2.56 2.68 3.32 2.90 2.71 3.37
Net Liabilities 18.63 22.11 25.37 31.69 35.37 33.27 34.91 35.98
Foreign Liabilities (banks) 14.97 17.05 21.00 23.49 24.07 23.48 24.82 24.23
Foreign Assets  (banks) 8.97 7.92 8.93 10.97 8.23 9.85 8.49 8.55
Net Liabilities 6.00 9.13 12.08 12.52 15.84 13.63 16.33 15.68
0DOD\VLD      4 4 4
Foreign Liabilities 16.02 14.48 18.76 25.91 29.08 31.23 33.00 29.47
Foreign Assets 19.24 10.32 13.03 17.49 13.07 18.88 17.47 13.93
Net Liabilities -3.21 4.15 5.72 8.41 16.01 12.35 15.53 15.54
Foreign Liabilities (non-banks) 4.26 3.91 5.54 6.92 6.46 7.06 7.50 6.70
Foreign Assets  (non-banks) 1.94 2.12 2.58 2.75 3.46 3.49 3.03 3.51
Net Liabilities 2.31 1.79 2.96 4.17 3.00 3.57 4.47 3.20
Foreign Liabilities (banks) 11.77 10.57 13.22 18.99 22.62 24.17 25.50 22.76
Foreign Assets  (banks) 17.29 8.21 10.46 14.74 9.61 15.39 14.44 10.42
Net Liabilities -5.53 2.36 2.76 4.25 13.01 8.78 11.06 12.35
3KLOLSSLQHV      4 4 4
Foreign Liabilities 6.61 6.54 8.07 13.51 16.61 15.11 17.02 16.79
Foreign Assets 5.81 6.75 7.34 7.84 9.70 8.59 7.68 9.84
Net Liabilities 0.80 -0.21 0.73 5.67 6.91 6.52 9.34 6.96
Foreign Liabilities (non-banks) 3.37 2.84 3.12 4.15 6.34 4.82 5.24 6.42
Foreign Assets  (non-banks) 2.96 3.22 3.31 3.06 3.14 3.15 3.30 3.17
Net Liabilities 0.42 -0.37 -0.19 1.09 3.20 1.68 1.94 3.25
Foreign Liabilities (banks) 3.24 3.70 4.95 9.36 10.27 10.28 11.78 10.37
Foreign Assets  (banks) 2.85 3.53 4.03 4.78 6.56 5.45 4.38 6.67
Net Liabilities 0.39 0.17 0.92 4.58 3.72 4.84 7.40 3.71
6LQJDSRUH      4 4 4
Foreign Liabilities 233.39 248.00 282.03 287.24 295.83 293.41 306.89 310.24
Foreign Assets 155.02 153.43 170.26 177.83 214.65 193.06 202.33 219.64
Net Liabilities 78.37 94.57 111.77 109.42 81.18 100.35 104.56 90.59
Foreign Liabilities (non-banks) 3.73 4.05 5.65 6.71 8.01 8.22 8.41 8.13
Foreign Assets  (non-banks) 9.56 10.88 12.07 13.62 14.16 13.72 13.77 14.38
Net Liabilities -5.82 -6.83 -6.43 -6.91 -6.16 -5.50 -5.36 -6.26
Foreign Liabilities (banks) 229.66 243.95 276.38 280.53 287.82 285.18 298.49 302.11
Foreign Assets  (banks) 145.47 142.55 158.19 164.21 200.49 179.34 188.56 205.26
Net Liabilities 84.19 101.40 118.19 116.32 87.33 105.85 109.92 96.8566
Source: Bank of International Settlements (BIS): International Banking and Financial Market Developments
7KDLODQG      4 4 4
Foreign Liabilities 34.73 54.44 92.18 99.27 79.66 99.82 99.54 81.82
Foreign Assets 5.01 7.04 11.81 9.00 9.81 10.09 8.78 9.95
Net Liabilities 29.72 47.40 80.37 90.27 69.84 89.73 90.76 71.86
Foreign Liabilities (non-banks) 9.14 9.81 12.56 14.13 12.00 13.84 13.50 12.23
Foreign Assets  (non-banks) 1.63 1.84 2.13 1.90 2.06 1.91 2.02 2.09
Net Liabilities 7.50 7.97 10.43 12.22 9.94 11.92 11.49 10.14
Foreign Liabilities (banks) 25.59 44.63 79.62 85.15 67.66 85.98 86.04 69.59
Foreign Assets  (banks) 3.38 5.20 9.68 7.10 7.75 8.17 6.76 7.86
Net Liabilities 22.22 39.43 69.94 78.05 59.90 77.81 79.28 61.73
+RQJ.RQJ      4 4 4
Foreign Liabilities 412.99 493.96 513.04 469.96 469.58 480.55 502.90 499.74
Foreign Assets 290.01 345.19 329.74 284.37 294.76 302.24 296.81 302.72
Net Liabilities 122.98 148.77 183.31 185.60 174.83 178.31 206.09 197.02
Foreign Liabilities (non-banks) 19.61 17.90 22.58 26.73 20.69 25.48 26.10 21.44
Foreign Assets  (non-banks) 49.41 53.08 54.28 60.47 64.34 63.02 63.53 65.04
Net Liabilities -29.80 -35.18 -31.70 -33.74 -43.66 -37.54 -37.43 -43.60
Foreign Liabilities (banks) 393.38 476.06 490.46 443.24 448.90 455.08 476.79 478.31
Foreign Assets  (banks) 240.60 292.11 275.46 223.90 230.42 239.22 233.27 237.68
Net Liabilities 152.78 183.95 215.00 219.34 218.48 215.86 243.52 240.63
&KLQD      4 4 4
Foreign Liabilities 48.59 56.46 67.06 79.75 90.08 82.18 86.33 91.20
Foreign Assets 49.16 59.95 57.43 66.54 66.40 64.58 64.99 67.04
Net Liabilities -0.57 -3.49 9.63 13.21 23.68 17.60 21.34 24.15
Foreign Liabilities (non-banks) 13.30 15.18 16.10 17.88 18.12 17.95 18.90 18.36
Foreign Assets  (non-banks) 2.50 2.73 2.92 3.00 3.79 3.70 3.98 3.86
Net Liabilities 10.81 12.46 13.17 14.88 14.33 14.26 14.93 14.51
Foreign Liabilities (banks) 35.29 41.28 50.96 61.87 71.96 64.22 67.43 72.83
Foreign Assets  (banks) 46.67 57.23 54.51 63.54 62.60 60.88 61.01 63.19
Net Liabilities -11.38 -15.94 -3.54 -1.67 9.36 3.34 6.42 9.65
7DLZDQ    4 4 4
Foreign Liabilities 22.13 22.79 22.43 24.69 25.23 22.66
Foreign Assets 36.03 37.48 36.46 37.37 36.23 37.27
Net Liabilities -13.90 -14.69 -14.04 -12.68 -11.00 -14.61
Foreign Liabilities (non-banks) 2.51 2.97 3.13 3.53 3.19 3.19
Foreign Assets  (non-banks) 7.28 8.22 9.03 8.30 8.34 9.10
Net Liabilities -4.77 -5.25 -5.90 -4.77 -5.15 -5.92
Foreign Liabilities (banks) 19.63 19.82 19.29 21.16 22.04 19.47
Foreign Assets  (banks) 28.76 29.27 27.44 29.07 27.89 28.16
Net Liabilities -9.13 -9.44 -8.14 -7.91 -5.85 -8.69
7DEOH/LDELOLWLHVWRZDUGV%,6%DQNV(% of GDP)
    
.RUHD 13.59 16.01 18.24 22.52 23.45
,QGRQHVLD 23.54 23.53 24.21 25.44 29.25
0DOD\VLD 24.96 19.97 21.48 26.10 29.53
3KLOLSSLQHV 12.16 10.21 10.88 16.31 20.20
6LQJDSRUH 400.24 349.10 330.15 305.37 307.16
7KDLODQG 27.73 37.71 54.82 54.71 51.75
+RQJ.RQJ 356.15 377.60 368.51 304.94 272.53
&KLQD 8.12 10.33 9.43 9.56 9.82
7DLZDQ 9.60 9.29 8.08 8.04 7.2967
Note: Source for Tables 30-32 and 36 is the Bank of International Settlements.
7DEOH&RQVROLGDWHGFURVVERUGHUFODLPVLQDOOFXUUHQFLHVDQGORFDOFODLPVLQQRQORFDOFXUUHQFLHV







.RUHD 44.0% 7.4% 48.5% 103.4
,QGRQHVLD 21.1% 11.1% 67.7% 58.7
0DOD\VLD 36.4% 6.4% 57.1% 28.8
7KDLODQG 37.6% 2.8% 59.5% 69.4
&KLQD 42.6% 13.2% 44.1% 57.9
7DLZDQ 61.6% 1.6% 36.8% 25.2
7DEOH5DWLRRI/LDELOLWLHVWR$VVHWVWRZDUGV%,6%DQNV
    
.RUHD 2.97 2.97 3.32 3.75 2.51
,QGRQHVLD 2.96 4.01 4.26 4.24 5.43
0DOD\VLD 0.83 1.40 1.44 1.48 2.23
3KLOLSSLQHV 1.14 0.97 1.10 1.72 1.71
6LQJDSRUH 1.51 1.62 1.66 1.62 1.38
7KDLODQG 6.93 7.73 7.81 11.03 8.12
+RQJ.RQJ 1.42 1.43 1.56 1.65 1.59
&KLQD 0.99 0.94 1.17 1.20 1.36
7DLZDQ 0.64 0.59 0.61 0.61 0.62
7DEOH6KRUW7HUP/LDELOLWLHVWRZDUGV%,6%DQNV(% of total liabilities at the end of 1996)
.RUHD 67% 7KDLODQG 65%
,QGRQHVLD 61% +RQJ.RQJ 82%
0DOD\VLD 50% &KLQD 49%
3KLOLSSLQHV 58% 7DLZDQ 84%
6LQJDSRUH 92%
7DEOH)RUHLJQ5HVHUYHV(in months of imports)
       
.RUHD 2.34 1.83 2.23 2.53 2.63 2.52 2.32 1.42
,QGRQHVLD 3.24 3.53 3.62 3.60 3.24 2.94 3.64 3.26
0DOD\VLD 3.68 2.98 4.71 5.64 4.53 3.29 3.59 2.73
3KLOLSSLQHV 0.75 2.63 2.93 2.59 2.81 2.33 2.95 1.79
7KDLODQG 4.49 5.03 5.35 5.64 5.65 5.35 5.53 4.40
+RQJ.RQJ 3.13 3.04 3.04 3.33 3.27 3.10 3.47 4.80
7DLZDQ 12.99 12.86 11.28 10.64 10.90 8.90 8.68 7.56
7DEOH0WR)RUHLJQ5HVHUYHV5DWLR
       
.RUHD 1.50 2.16 1.84 1.79 1.57 1.54 1.44 1.81
,QGRQHVLD 1.73 1.48 1.30 1.44 1.58 1.53 1.21 1.62
0DOD\VLD 0.96 0.93 0.81 0.69 0.84 1.07 1.16 1.46
3KLOLSSLQHV 4.14 1.21 1.05 1.13 1.01 1.19 0.89 1.24
6LQJDSRUH 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.26
7KDLODQG 0.57 0.50 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.43 0.44 0.52
+RQJ.RQJ 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.35 0.23
&KLQD 4.95 3.87 10.30 12.99 4.72 4.07 3.45 3.24
7DLZDQ 0.99 0.98 1.18 1.27 1.28 1.32 1.42 1.5568
7DEOH&KURQRORJ\RI,0),QWHUYHQWLRQLQ$VLD
 — 7KDLODQG announces a managed float of the baht and IMF negotiations begin.
 — The 3KLOLSSLQHV extends and augments its existing IMF-supported program of 1997, and arranges a stand-by
facility in 1998. IMF offers Philippines USD 1.1b loan package.
 — IMF approves a USD 3.9b credit for 7KDLODQG. The plan assumes a positive growth of 2.5 percent in 1997 and
3.5 percent in 1998; and calls for maintaining gross official reserves at the equivalent of 4.2 months of imports
in 1997 and 4.4 months in 1998; limiting the end-period rate of inflation to 9.5 percent in 1997 and 5 percent in
1998; targeting a small overall fiscal surplus by 1998 through an increase in the rate of the value-added-tax
(VAT), and selective expenditure cuts; initiating a credible and up-front restructuring of the financial sector,
focused on the identification and closure of unviable financial institution (56 finance companies).
 — ,QGRQHVLDQ government agrees to request help from IMF.
 — The International Monetary Fund announces a $23 billion multilateral financial package involving the World
Bank and Asian Development Bank to help ,QGRQHVLD stabilize its financial system.
 — The IMF approves a USD 10b stand-by credit for ,QGRQHVLD and releases a disbursement of USD 3b.
Measures include financial sector restructuring, with the closure of 16 insolvent banks; structural reforms to
enhance economic efficiency and transparency, with the liberalization of foreign trade and investment, the
dismantling of monopolies, and privatization; stabilizing the rupiah through a tight monetary policy;
7DEOH0WR)RUHLJQ5HVHUYHV5DWLR
       
.RUHD 6.48 8.33 7.20 6.91 6.45 6.11 6.51 10.50
,QGRQHVLD 6.16 5.51 5.61 6.09 6.55 7.09 6.50 7.37
0DOD\VLD 2.91 2.99 2.64 2.09 2.47 3.33 3.66 4.99
3KLOLSSLQHV 16.33 4.82 4.35 4.90 4.86 5.86 4.50 6.97
6LQJDSRUH 1.23 1.18 1.17 1.05 1.06 1.05 1.03 1.17
7KDLODQG 4.49 4.10 4.10 4.05 3.84 3.69 3.90 5.29
+RQJ.RQJ 5.43 4.84 4.54 4.43 4.35 4.25 3.18
&KLQD 10.37 8.00 21.39 26.93 10.29 9.65 8.55 7.76
7DLZDQ 3.20 3.36 4.28 4.61 4.78 5.35 5.78 6.30
7DEOH6KRUW7HUP/LDELOLWLHVWRZDUGV%,6%DQNV(% of foreign reserves, end of 1996)
.RUHD 213% 3KLOLSSLQHV 77%
,QGRQHVLD 181% 7KDLODQG 169%
0DOD\VLD 47% &KLQD 36%
7DEOH&RQWULEXWLRQRI,QZDUG)',WR&XUUHQW$FFRXQW)LQDQFLQJ(% of current account deficit)
       
.RUHD 45.16 14.19 18.43 -59.39 20.92 20.88 10.11 34.82
,QGRQHVLD 36.58 34.79 63.92 95.16 75.54 67.58 80.83 97.11
0DOD\VLD 268.05 95.58 239.18 180.13 98.27 90.10 110.84 139.28
3KLOLSSLQHV 19.67 52.61 22.80 41.05 53.93 74.65 38.38 29.12
7KDLODQG 33.57 26.60 33.52 28.35 16.90 15.26 15.90 103.84
7DEOH*URZWKRI)RUHLJQ5HVHUYHVLQ86'ROODUV(% growth rate, 1990-1996)
.RUHD 127% 6LQJDSRUH 176%
,QGRQHVLD 144% 7KDLODQG 183%
0DOD\VLD 176% +RQJ.RQJ 159%
3KLOLSSLQHV 985% &KLQD 261%69
implementing fiscal measures equivalent to 1% of GDP in 1997/1998, and 2% in 1998/99, to yield a 1% of
GDP surplus in both years.
 — .RUHD requests IMF assistance.
 — In light of a larger-than-expected depreciation of the baht, a second IMF package for 7KDLODQG is approved.
The new plan includes additional measures to maintain the targeted fiscal surplus of 1% of GDP, the
establishment of a timetable for financial sector restructuring, and plans to protect the weaker sectors of
society.
 — IMF approves a USD 21b stand-by credit for .RUHD and releases a disbursement of USD 5.6b. The initial
program assumes GDP growth in 1998 of 2.5% and features comprehensive financial sector restructuring,
including central bank independence, strong market and supervisory discipline, and the suspension of 9
insolvent merchant banks. Fiscal measures equivalent to 2% of GDP make room for the cost of financial
restructuring, consistently with a balanced budget target. The plan calls for efforts to dismantle the non-
transparent and inefficient ties among government banks and business; for the implementation of trade and
capital account liberalization measures, as well as of labor market reforms; for the publication and
dissemination of key economic and financial data.
 — Disbursement of USD 810m to7KDLODQG.
 — .RUHDQ government allows won to float.
 — Disbursement of USD 3.5bto .RUHD.
 — .RUHD issues a letter of intent pointing at the need for an acceleration of the program as the situation
deteriorates. The plan includes further monetary tightening, the abolition of the daily exchange rate band, the
lifting of all capital account restrictions. Financial sector reform and market liberalization, as well as trade
liberalization, are expedited. The IMF also announces that a debt rescheduling by international commercial
banks is critical to Korea’s recovery.
 — Disbursement of USD 2b to .RUHD.
 —  Disbursement of US 2b to.RUHD.
 — A second package for ,QGRQHVLD is agreed upon. The plan allows for a relaxation of the previous fiscal targets,
that is now a budget deficit equal to 1% of GDP. Previous IMF conditions not fulfilled but reiterated in the
second package include: dismantling of government monopolies, postponing infrastructure projects, and
closing insolvent banks.
 — International lenders agree on plan to officially roll over .RUHD¶V short-term debt.
 — .RUHD agrees to third IMF program. GDP growth projections are lowered to 1%. The letter of intent includes
additional measures to target fiscal deficit to 1% of GDP, increasing the amount of financial instruments
available to foreign investors, and broadening the financial sector reform strategy to accommodate
stabilization of short-term debt payments.
 — Disbursement of US 2bto .RUHD.
 — The 7KDL plan is further modified. The fiscal policy target is adjusted from a surplus of 1% of GDP to a deficit
of 2% of GDP.
 — Disbursement of US 270m to7KDLODQG
 — ,QGRQHVLD issues a Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies on additional measures.
These include a strong monetary policies, accelerated bank restructuring, a comprehensive agenda of
structural reforms. The IMF allows ,QGRQHVLD to continue its fuel and power subsidies. In the light of the failure
of the first two packages, the IMF will resort to a stricter enforcement of provisions.
 — .RUHDQ authorities update the program of economic reforms. Growth forecasts for 1998 are further revised
downward to –2%. The letter of intent includes the accommodation of a larger fiscal deficit of about 2% of GDP
in 1998, measures to strengthen and expand the social safety net, the loosening of restrictions on foreign
exchange transactions, and the formation of an appraisal committee to evaluate recapitalization plans by
undercapitalized banks.
 — Disbursement of USD 1b to ,QGRQHVLD.
 — Fourth IMF program agreed to by 7KDLODQG.  The main priority is to prevent any further slow-down of the
economy and foster an early recovery. The modified program calls for cautious and gradual reductions of
interest rates, higher monetary growth rates, a looser fiscal deficit target at 3% of GDP, and accelerated
corporate debt restructuring with financial sector reforms.
 ² Disbursement of USD 2b to .RUHD
 — Disbursement of USD 135m to 7KDLODQG.
 — Additional IMF reforms agreed to by ,QGRQHVLD in light of changing political climate and worsening economic
situation. Provisions include an increase in social expenditures (7.5% of GDP), a budget deficit target at 8.5%
of GDP, the closure, merging or recapitalization of weak banks, and the establishment of a bankruptcy system.
 — Disbursement of USD 1b to ,QGRQHVLD The IMF increases financing by USD 1.4b.
 — A new letter of intent by .RUHD announces a further easing of macroeconomic policies. The letter includes the
accommodation of a larger fiscal deficit for 1998 (5% of GDP), and measures to bolster the social expenditure
program.
 — The  ,QGRQHVLDQ government requests the cancellation of the existing arrangement with the IMF and its
replacement with a new extended arrangement, including new measures on bank and corporate restructuring
and improvements in the distribution system.
 — Disbursement of USD 1b to ,QGRQHVLD The IMF approves an extended facility with a longer repayment period.
 — The  7KDL program is modified to incorporate a more comprehensive approach to bank and corporate
restructuring. The fiscal deficit target is still at 3% of GDP, for both 1998 and 1999, but this target excludes the
costs of financial sector restructuring.
 — IMF disburses USD 1b to .RUHD.References
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